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BOARD ROOMS AND JAIL CELLS: ASSESSING NGO
APPROACHES TO PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE
Joshua Ulan Galperin*
Although it had been mentioned in other disciplines, the term
“private environmental governance” entered the legal literature in
2007.1 In the first paragraph of the article that imported the term,
Professor Michael Vandenbergh wrote, “Nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), rather than lobbying national and
international governmental bodies to generate public
requirements, are using consumer pressure to demand that
corporations engage in . . . private regulation.”2 Thus, from its
very beginning, the legal scholarship on private environmental
governance has explicitly acknowledged the role of NGOs. As
the study of private environmental governance has grown in
volume, sophistication, and recognition, the role of NGOs has
remained explicit but has not developed far beyond the mere

*Josh Galperin is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law and, in the early stages of this project, was on the faculty at Yale Law School
and the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. Sincere thanks to Clay Sapp, Jen
Hosp, and other editors of the Arkansas Law Review for organizing the wonderful
symposium out of which this article grew. Thanks also to Sara Rollet Gosman for the
invitation to present my work at the symposium. Finally, and most importantly, thank you to
Alex Schluntz for her tireless research assistance and willingness to debate and brainstorm
these ideas with me.
1. Westlaw search, Jun. 7, 2018, for “private environmental governance” identifies
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 925 (2007) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, WalMart] as the first instance of the term in the legal literature. Use of “private environmental
governance” in other fields predated Professor Vandenbergh’s 2007 usage. See, e.g., Robert
Falkner, Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the
Links, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 72 (2003); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 139 (2013) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance] (“[A]n enormous amount of scholarship
has been published on private governance activities, although much of that scholarship has
appeared in the social science literature or areas of the legal literature outside of
environmental law.”).
2. Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 915.
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recognition of their importance. 3 By developing and applying a
framework for assessment of NGO activity and rhetoric, this
article aims to start a more vigorous consideration of the role of
NGOs in private environmental governance.
A brief comparison of two well-known environmental
NGOs through the lens of private environmental governance
should help illustrate the value of a more precise and purposeful
assessment of NGO strategies. The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
prides itself on its non-confrontational, collaborative deal
making,4 partnering closely with corporations like chemical giant
Dow and agricultural lightning rod Monsanto. 5 Both Dow and
Monsanto, in fact, are members of TNC’s Business Council along
with the likes of BP, Shell, and Cargill. 6 Greenpeace, on the other
hand, prides itself on direct action, civil disobedience, and nonviolent confrontation. 7 Greenpeace has launched combative
operations against Dow, Monsanto, and other TNC
collaborators.8 While business partners praise TNC’s cooperative
3. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private
Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 3, 9, 22 (2015) (describing
NGOs as not just influencers in private environmental governance, but also as private actors
because they are not public institutions and recognizing the importance of NGO instrument
choice in private environmental governance contexts); Steph Tai, Private Environmental
Governance and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 111, 113 (2016)
(identifying the role of NGOs in fostering private environmental governance); Vandenbergh,
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 1, at 168-70 (discussing the role of advocacy
groups in private environmental governance).
4. About Us, NATURE CONSERVANCY [hereinafter TNC, About Us], https://
www.nature.org/ about-us/ index.htm ?intc =nature. tnav.about [https://perma.cc/6XKFR6BG] (“We pursue non-confrontational, pragmatic solutions to conservation
challenges. . . . We partner with . . . businesses . . . .”).
5. Working with Companies: Companies We Work With, NATURE CONSERVANCY,
https:// www.nature.org/ about-us/ working- with- companies/ companies- we- workwith/index.htm [https://perma.cc/W64Z-BGR5] (listing The Dow Chemical Company as a
partner); Working with Companies: Business Councils, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://
www.nature.org/ about-us/ working-with-companies/ businesscouncil/ilc-main-content.xml
[https://perma.cc/3YVQ-9PWS] (identifying Monsanto Co. as a member of the Business
Council).
6. Working with Companies: Business Councils, supra note 5.
7.
About, GREENPEACE [hereinafter Greenpeace, About], http:// www.
greenpeace.org/ usa/ about/ [https://perma.cc/EER9-3TMY].
8. See, e.g., Greenpeace Blockades Dow’s Texas Headquarters, GREENPEACE, http://
www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/greenpeace-blockades-dow-s-tex/ [https://perma.cc/8W76ZALS] (describing a blockade of Dow’s Texas headquarters); Cassady Craighill, 6 Reasons
to March Against Monsanto May 25th, GREENPEACE (May 22, 2013), http://
www.greenpeace.org/ usa/ 6- reasons- to- march- against- monsanto- may- 25th/
[https://perma.cc/T5HT-S4U4] (organizing a march against Monsanto).
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efforts,9 they attack Greenpeace’s strategies, which have been the
subject of litigation accusing Greenpeace of, among other things,
racketeering, conspiracy, and defamation. 10 To put the distinction
between these two NGOs more starkly: staff of the Nature
Conservancy find themselves in board rooms.
Staff of
Greenpeace find themselves in jail cells.
Given the stark differences in personality and reputation,
when it comes to prioritizing environmental protection strategies
it is surprising to consider that Greenpeace and TNC are in full
agreement on at least one key point. Both TNC and Greenpeace
are, fundamentally, proponents of private environmental
governance. Private environmental governance is the striving for
public goals through private endeavor. 11 Through private land
conservation and corporate collaborations, TNC is squarely
engaged in private environmental governance. 12 Though less
obviously so, through public pressure on private companies,
reputational campaigns, and consumer persuasion, Greenpeace
too seeks to change the market and the behavior of private
companies to achieve environmental goals without relying on
government.13
“Some groups” write professors Andrew J. Hoffman and
Stephanie Bertels “define their identity in terms of a conflict
orientation to corporations and corporate activities, others in
terms of a consensus orientation with businesses and the capitalist
system.”14 This observation, when paired with the comparison
9. See, e.g., The Nature Conservancy, Importance of Corporate Sustainability – The
Dow Chemical Company, YOUTUBE (Jun. 19, 2012), https:// www.youtube.com/ embed/
zDHU6tp6CCY [https://perma.cc/SYW2-P33L] (“[W]e’re very excited about the
collaboration with TNC . . . .”); The Nature Conservancy, Importance of Corporate
Sustainability – The Coca-Cola Company, YOUT UBE (Jun. 19, 2012) https://
www.youtube.com/ embed/_INXZSEHOh0 [https://perma.cc/4S9L-KB77] (explaining that
working with TNC has been “a tremendous value that I think collectively we deliver”).
10. Nicholas Kusnetz, Industry Lawsuits Try to Paint Environmental Activism as
Illegal Racket, INSIDEC LIMATE NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017), https:// insideclimatenews.org/ news/
04102017/greenpeace- rico- racketeering- lawsuit- environmental- activism- resolutedakota-access- [https://perma.cc/J7WW-T2KA].
11. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 1, at 133.
12. TNC, About Us, supra note 4.
13. Greenpeace, About, supra note 7.
14. Andrew J. Hoffman & Stephanie Bertels, Who is Part of the Environmental
Movement? Assessing Network Linkages Between NGOs and Corporations, in GOOD
COP/BAD COP: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AND THEIR S TRATEGIES TOWARD BUSINESS 48, 62
(Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010).
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between Greenpeace and TNC, highlights the value of careful
attention to how environmental NGOs situate themselves in
relation to governance rather than in relation to corporations.
TNC certainly defines itself as a corporate-consensus-oriented
group, while Greenpeace accepts its corporate-conflict
orientation.
But the conflict/cooperation gradient is an
oversimplification because it neglects NGOs’ more fundamental
governance philosophies, preferences, and strategies. That is, as
the TNC-Greenpeace comparison illustrates, regardless of an
NGO’s relationship with corporations, it can still be a supporter
of the “capitalist system” to which Hoffman and Bertels refer. 15
It can still be a participant in, even a supporter of, private
governance if the NGO seeks change primarily in private actors
rather than public regulations.
This brief comparison signals the need to look closely at the
goals, strategies, targets, and tactics of environmental NGOs, and
this article offers a framework for taking that closer look. More
rigorous analysis of environmental NGOs will help scholars and
practitioners better understand surprising overlaps such as the one
between TNC and Greenpeace. It will allow us to frame NGO
operations in a consistent way that will facilitate ongoing
comparison, which will in turn help us understand the past,
present, and future of private environmental governance.
Because NGOs so often engage in both private and public
strategies, a standardized framework for analyzing NGO
operations will also help tease apart the way in which engagement
with private environmental governance will impact the success of
and reliance on more traditional public environmental
governance. This article presents a framework for assessing NGO
efforts and will apply that framework to a diverse set of prominent
environmental NGOs in order to demonstrate its value.
The next section of this article will explore the literature on
private environmental governance to uncover the way scholars
have so far considered the role of NGOs. Section III will detail
the NGO assessment framework that this article proposes.
Section IV will explain the methods for data gathering and
analysis. Section V will present the findings of the framework as
applied to a small set of diverse environmental NGOs. Section
15. Id. at 61-62.
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VI offers concluding thoughts on the important role of NGOs in
private environmental governance.

II. NGOS IN THE PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE LITERATURE
The literature on private environmental governance is diverse,
but, at least in the legal academy, has yet to address the role of
NGOs in detail. This section looks closely at those legal articles
on private environmental governance that have offered some
insight into the role of NGOs, looks briefly at the non-legal
literature, and attempts to summarize the field as a baseline for
analyzing specific NGOs.
A. The Legal Literature
When Professor Vandenbergh introduced the concept of
private environmental governance to the legal academy in 2007
he made sure to highlight the role of NGOs.16 Not only did his
article, The New Wal-Mart Effect, focus on NGOs in the very first
paragraph, it also considered their importance throughout the
analysis and returned to NGOs in the two concluding
paragraphs.17
Wal-Mart’s broad lesson is that environmental governance
has shifted since it came to the national stage in the early 1970s.18
Modern environmental governance is primarily characterized by
“the traditional focus on states and governments.” 19 The 1990s
saw a shift from government supremacy to public-private hybrid
governance, as characterized by so-called New Governance or
collaborative governance.20 The more recent change that
Vandenbergh identified was yet another step in the trend of
increased private responsibility and decreased public primacy. In
many cases, “fields that have traditionally been the subject of
state-centric public regulation” were not only being governed
through hybrid public-private decisionmaking, private parties
were becoming the exclusive decisionmakers.21 This is private
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 915.
Id. at 915, 942, 960-63, 966-70.
Id. at 915.
Id.
Id.
Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 915.
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environmental governance, which “bypasses government
altogether.”22
To demonstrate the contours of private environmental
governance, Wal-Mart begins by highlighting the challenges to
state action, particularly in international-trade-related
environmental governance. 23 The problem is that importing
countries may have strong domestic environmental protection
regimes but they do not control the environmental impacts of
production in exporting countries. 24 The importing countries may
lack political will or World Trade Organization standards may
limit environmentally-protective trade restrictions. 25 Thus, while
domestic governments are hamstrung, private firms can—and
do—fill “the gap in public regulation of exporting firms’
environmental behavior . . . .”26
Vandenbergh provides a typology of private governance
strategies. Collective standard setting involves industry-specific
standards such as the Forest Stewardship Council’s standards for
sustainable forestry productions. 27 Unilateral standards are those
standards adopted by an individual firm, which apply to their own
operations and purchasing. 28 General Electric, for example,
adopted a set of unilateral standards in 1997, which focus on
environmental, health, and safety factors and are implemented
and monitored exclusively by General Electric auditors and
employees.29 Private contracting is the final category. Private
contracting includes a wide range of agreements, and
Vandenbergh focuses here on contracts between importing and
exporting firms.30
These contracts can include supply
agreements, merger and acquisition agreements, credit
agreements, insurance agreements, and more. 31 In all cases, these
contracts can include provisions that demand specific
environmental processes or products, monitoring, auditing, and
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 919-21.
Id.
Id. at 920-21.
Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 921.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 924.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 925.
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information disclosure, among other environmentally conscious
terms.32
One might wonder why private firms would engage in
environmental governance of this nature. Vandenbergh points to
two related drivers. The first is the “role of consumer
preference.”33 Consumer preference is a simple economic
calculation—if consumers prefer environmentally considerate
companies then companies that can deliver will reap the
benefits—but it is also about a more robust social license. 34 The
social license to operate demands that a firm maintains a
“favorable view” and “favorable treatment by customers,
shareholders, employees, and the communities in which they
operate.”35
NGOs at least partially create and communicate both the
basic consumer preference and the social license. 36
As
Vandenbergh explains, “[i]t is not possible to evaluate fully which
firms were targeted by NGOs, but many of the firms examined
[in the New Wal-Mart Effect] . . . adopted environmental
contracting requirements after NGO public information
campaigns or boycotts. Prominent examples of such firms
include Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Staples.” 37
NGOs gain their power because they can “shape or activate
these consumer preferences and seek to convert them into
credible threats of boycotts or negative public relations
campaigns.”38
The active, public, combative pressure is
Vandenbergh’s primary characterization of NGOs in private
environmental governance. He frequently cites the “sustained
pressure by NGOs,”39 “NGO-led boycotts or public information
campaigns,”40 “consumer pressure . . . created by or merely
expressed by NGOs,”41 how “firms were targeted by NGOs,”

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 946-47.
Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 947.
Id.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 942.
Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 947.
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“intense NGO pressure,”42 “NGO protests,”43 “NGOs’ ability to
coerce,” “credible threat by mobilizing private volunteers,” 44 and
the way that “NGOs can sanction importing firms” or “bring
pressure to bear.”45
The only NGO that Professor Vandenbergh mentions by
name is Greenpeace, 46 which certainly fits the characterization of
NGOs as public pressure groups. Based on this aggressive
characterization and perhaps with Greenpeace as his primary
image, Vandenbergh offers several ideas for improving private
environmental governance both by creating new avenues for
NGO engagement and reforming NGO participation. Among his
more radical ideas is that governments could “modify contract or
tort law principles to give NGOs or other private parties the right
to enforce supply-chain contract terms even where the importing
firm is unwilling to do so.”47 A change of this nature would allow
NGOs to go beyond mere mobilization and to access more
assertive and direct forms of influence in private governance, akin
to their role in enforcing public regulatory programs through
citizen suits. It would also require that NGOs see themselves at
least partially as adversaries of private firms.
An alternative option, one that Vandenbergh describes as “a
more viable option” is “changes in the culture and strategy of
NGOs and their donors.”48 This suggestion certainly relies on a
vision of NGOs first as antagonists, a vision of NGOs that are
essentially in the mold of Greenpeace. Thus, Vandenbergh notes:
Employees and members of NGOs form beliefs and norms
that may lead to reluctance to focus NGO efforts on private
environmental contracting initiatives. They may be unduly
skeptical that firms will adopt or enforce standards of
conduct in response to anything but government pressure. In
particular, they may be reluctant to accept that firms in some
circumstances may have social and market incentives to
abide by firm standards and to enforce the relevant
provisions in agreements with other firms. Some level of
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 961.
Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 960.
Id. at 968.
Id.
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collaboration with private firms following the application of
pressure may be necessary to shape adequate requirements,
yet collaboration may be viewed as morally suspect. NGOs
may also fear that private measures will undermine efforts to
induce
governments
to
regulate.49

Given these predispositions, “Cultural changes within NGOs
on these and related issues may be the most important element in
the development of private environmental contracting as a form
of governance.”50 Vandenbergh finally notes that, without
cultural change, NGOs could push for overly burdensome
“private standards that reflect NGO biases [and] may lead to
misallocation of economic resources.” 51
This description of NGOs as antagonists and hope for a more
collaborative regime reflects a view of NGOs that is based on a
relatively narrow sample of NGO philosophies. Greenpeace, or
other similarly assertive NGOs such as the Rainforest Action
Network, give rise to this view. 52 But TNC or similarly
collaborative groups like the Environmental Defense Fund are
also important, perhaps even dominant, players. 53
The New Wal-Mart Effect, as the first legal scholarship on
private environmental governance, was an empirical
demonstration of the field’s importance. 54 In 2013 Vandenbergh
offered a more comprehensive, theoretical assessment of private
environmental governance. 55 This article, Private Environmental
49. Id. at 968-69. A decade after Vandenbergh’s article, I made exactly these critiques
in Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me, I’m A Pragmatist: A Partially Pragmatic Critique of
Pragmatic Activism, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 425 (2017) [hereinafter Galperin, Trust Me].
50. Id. at 969.
51. Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 970.
52. Greenpeace, About, supra note 7; Fighting for People & Planet: RAN’s Mission,
Vision & Values, RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, https:// www.ran.org/ mission_ and_
values [https://perma.cc/WTD6-QS7A] (“Rainforest Action Network preserves forests,
protects the climate and upholds human rights by challenging corporate power and systemic
injustice . . . .”).
53. TNC, About Us, supra note 4; About Environmental Defense Fund, ENVTL. DEF.
FUND, https://www.edf.org/about [https://perma.cc/9KY9-JWFG] (“We build strong
partnerships across interests . . . .”). The Nature Conservancy and the Environmental
Defense Fund are among the largest environmental groups in the United States on a number
of metrics including revenue. The 200 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES, https://
www.forbes.com/ lists/ 2011/14/200-largest-us-charities-11_rank-environment-animal.html
[https://perma.cc/6CNW-L987] (filter by category Environment/Animal).
54. Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 918.
55. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 1, at 139-40.
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Governance, also offered a more nuanced view of NGO
engagement.56 Here, Professor Vandenbergh identifies NGOs as
typical pressure groups as well as collaborators who have an
“iterative” relationship with corporate executives. 57
Recognizing the collaborative relationship between NGOs
and corporations that parallels the combative relationship,
Vandenbergh spends time considering this partnership
orientation.
NGOs and corporations can have financial
58
relationships and they can have face-to-face interactions. 59
These connections could lead to conflicts of interests as the
adversarial wall crumbles, but Vandenbergh argues that the social
norms that distinguish advocates from corporate leaders will help
avoid potential conflicts. 60 The attention to potential conflicts,
however, is a matter more of legitimacy than practicality. It
implies that NGOs are playing a legitimizing function in addition
to the motivating function described in Wal-Mart. One could
alternatively look at the NGO not as having any particular public
responsibility, but instead as a mere private party, making NGOcorporate engagement “just another form of private-private”
market behavior. 61
The conception of NGOs as purely private actors is an
accurate legal description, but it is unsatisfactory because it leaves
a gap in the theoretical foundations of private environmental
governance. Private environmental governance, Vandenbergh
explains, does not “draw on democratic institutions for its
legitimacy.”62 He proposes that accountability within private
environmental governance may not be as important as it is in
public governance because private governance does not rely on
“the coercive power of government.” 63 The same argument may
be valid for effectiveness. A public command, which burdens
individual liberties, may be unjustified if it is ineffective. A
parallel private action arguably has no (or at least more limited)
56. See, e.g., id. at 168 (noting that NGOs not only publicize but also collaborate to
form standards and labeling systems).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 169.
59. Id. at 169-70.
60. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 1, at 170.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 171.
63. Id.
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impacts on private liberty, that is, fewer individual costs, and
therefore does not demand the same proof of effectiveness. But
there is no similar argument for why private governance—simply
because it is private—should escape the need for legitimacy.
Whether public, private, or somewhere between, an act that
impacts the public interest should have some legitimacy: some
claim to being a valid exercise of control.
Professor Vandenbergh, of course, has not ignored the issue
of legitimacy. In his 2007 article Vandenbergh describes the way
that NGOs can perform a legitimizing function by facilitating
public participation. 64 This is especially true when NGOs are in
a combative role, wielding and influencing consumer pressures.65
In 2018, with the recognition that NGOs play a wider variety of
roles, including as collaborators, there may be some concern that
their ability to counterbalance corporate practices is softened.
In fact, it is not only the NGO-corporate relationship that can
soften, or otherwise impact, NGO effectiveness. The legal or
private governance tools an NGO prefers can also impact NGO
success. Professors Sarah Light and Eric Orts have recently
offered a more normative approach to private environmental
governance, fitting it into a toolbox of environmental protection
options, and offering normative considerations for utilizing those
tools.66 Through their analysis, Light and Orts describe NGOs as
independent agents and independent participants in private
environmental governance who must make their own choices
about legitimizing, undermining, facilitating, or otherwise
influencing private environmental governance. 67
The thrust of Light and Orts’ work is that, when considering
policy instruments for environmental protection, both public
governance and private governance offer parallel instruments, but
the similarity of instruments should not imply similar
64. Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 957-58.
65. Id. at 958.
66. See generally Light & Orts, supra note 3.
67. See id. at 53-54, 56 (“[O]ur analysis highlights the complexity of who is doing the
choosing among governance options. . . . [T]here is no . . . single ‘chooser.’ Instead, there
are often many ‘choosers’—including government regulators (at multiple levels of
government), NGOs, private business firm managers, and individuals acting in their
capacities as both citizens and consumers. And these diverse ‘choosers’ are acting
simultaneously, sometimes in concert, and sometimes not.” Likewise, “[i]ncluding private
environmental governance in the menu of options suggests that additional normative
considerations must also be weighed, including . . . legitimacy.”).
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consequences. 68 Private governance introduces not only new
instruments, but also new “choosers[,]” and it is important to
consider “who is doing the choosing among governance
options.”69 The nature of both the chooser and the instrument has
impacts on “accountability and transparency, legitimacy,
transnational consequences, durability and adaptability, and
expressive content.”70
NGOs, Light and Orts explain, are not merely influencers of
private environmental governance, they are also private
environmental governance actors. 71 NGO policies are private
environmental governance policies. 72 In other words, NGOs are
agents within the private environmental governance framework
just as corporations are. By underscoring that NGOs are private
actors with meaningful agency, Light and Orts shift the way we
should look at the role of NGOs. It is not simply about how NGOs
relate to corporations but also the instruments that NGOs prefer,
the actors that NGOs target, the tactics that NGOs use. In short,
it is about the “expressive content” of the decisions that NGOs
make as independent agents. 73
This article offers a framework for assessing how NGOs, as
private agents, approach these issues of instrument choice, tactics,
and targets. But before sifting to that assessment, it is important
to look at the non-legal scholarship 74 on NGO participation in
private environmental governance, and to consider how that work
relates to the current analysis.

B. The Non-Legal Literature
Much of the early research into NGO environmental
strategies came from political science 75 but has recently become

68. Id. at 53-54.
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Light & Orts, supra note 3, at 3.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id. at 56.
74. Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001).
75. Lettie M. McSpadden & Paul J. Culhane, The Strategies and Tactics of Interest
Groups: The Case of the Environmental and Energy Policy Arena, 27 SE. POL. REV. 223,
223-24 (1999).
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prevalent in the management and organizational behavior fields. 76
One important benefit of this literature is that it offers a series of
typologies that can help classify individual NGOs and therefore
understand their general character. Perhaps as a natural
consequence of the distinct disciplines, political scientists have
created typologies based on the behavior of different
organizations 77 while the business experts focus more on
relationships and networks, particularly networks that link NGOs
to corporations.78
In their 1999 study of environmental NGOs, professors
Lettie McSpadden and Paul Culhane asked whether different
types of NGOs used different strategies and tactics.79 They
divided NGOs into public interest groups (on which this article
focuses exclusively), trade associations, and professionalgovernmental associations. 80
(This third grouping, while
seemingly including governmental organizations, is in fact a
group of professional associations including those associations,
such as the National Association of Local Air Pollution Control
Officials, that are made up exclusively of government employees
but are not official governmental organizations.) 81 McSpadden
and Culhane concluded that environmentalist organizations
primarily rely “on aggressive litigation and administrative
intervention tactic, with informational activity focused on
Congress as their second most important strategy.” 82
This conclusion is, or was in 1999, probably a reasonable
aggregate characterization of environmental advocacy groups
when compared to trade and professional associations.
McSpadden and Culhane reached this conclusion by surveying
groups and asking them to fit their tactics into a predetermined
list.83 That list, however, did not include options such as
76. See Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 14, at 62; see generally Stephanie Bertels et
al., The Varied Work of Challenger Movements: Identifying Challenger Roles in the US
Environmental Movement, 35 ORG. STUD. 1171 (2014) [hereinafter Bertels et al., Challenger
Movements]; Andrew J. Hoffman, Shades of Green, SANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV.,
Spring 2009, at 40 [hereinafter Hoffman, Shades of Green].
77. See, e.g., McSpadden & Culhane, supra note 75, at 228.
78. See generally, e.g., Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76.
79. McSpadden & Culhane, supra note 75, at 224.
80. Id at 228.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 239.
83. Id. at 229.
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“collaborate with the private sector.” 84 Even if the questionnaire
had been more inclusive, the purpose of the study was to see if an
a priori typology of NGOs into public interest, trade, and
professional categories would uncover distinctive tactics. 85 It
therefore intentionally avoids a more nuanced look specifically
within the public interest type. More recent research in
organizational behavior, however, provides this closer look at
public interest environmental NGOs.
Andrew J. Hoffman, an expert in organizational behavior, is
one of the leading scholars to examine the role of NGOs in private
environmental governance. 86 In three related papers, Professor
Hoffman and collaborators (in particular, Professor Stephanie
Bertels) define a network of environmental NGOs, analyze the
connections in that network, and create a typology to understand
the variety of NGO/corporate relationships. 87
While McSpadden and Culhane characterize public interest
environmental NGOs as “aggressive,” 88 Professor Hoffman
attempts to go several steps beyond this generalization. In his
2009 study, Shades of Green, Hoffman begins by noting that most
people do not see a monolithic NGO community, but instead
believe that environmental NGOs have “split into two camps, one
that partners with businesses and the other that doesn’t.” 89 Even
this distinction, he argues, is “too simplistic.” 90
Shades of Green seeks to overcome the simplistic view of
environmental NGOs and proposes that an investigation of “the
environmental movement through a network lens” is more
useful.91 Thus, using a network mapping software package,
Professor Hoffman produced two maps, “one showing the
relationships that ENGOs have with individual corporations and

84. McSpadden & Culhane, supra note 75, at 230 tbl.2.
85. Id. at 228.
86. See Faculty Directory: Andy Hoffman, UNIV. MICH. ROSS SCH. BUS., https://
michiganross.umich.edu/ faculty-research/ faculty/ andy-hoffman [https://perma.cc/9METY24E].
87. Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76; Hoffman, Shades of Green,
supra note 76; Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 14.
88. McSpadden & Culhane, supra note 75, at 239.
89. Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 40.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 42.
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the other showing the relationships ENGOs have with various
industry sectors.”92
These maps detail five types of environmental NGOs.93
“Isolate” NGOs are those that do not have any corporate
connections, they are “outside the corporate network.”94 This is
the single largest category in Hoffman’s typology despite the fact
that isolation may limit an NGO’s “ability to influence corporate
activity directly.”95 Isolation does create a “sense of purity” that
can strengthen the isolate’s message and make these groups “the
compass by which the movement can guide itself.” 96 Examples
of Isolates include Greenpeace and the League of Conservation
Voters, which, although they occupy a similar position in the
network, are in this position for different reasons.97 Hoffman
argues that Greenpeace is isolated because it wants to take an
oppositional position, while the League of Conservation Voters is
isolated because it wants to maintain impartiality and objectivity
in its political analysis. 98
“Mediators” are those NGOs both at the center of the
corporate network and that have ties to many different industrial
sectors.99 This group may not be the largest, but it does include
the largest NGOs such as TNC and the Environmental Defense
Fund.100 These are the groups that “tend to be more pragmatic
than others, fully engaging the corporate community through tight
connections in the network.” 101 Hoffman believes that these
mediator NGOs are the ones “most able to accomplish broadscale changes within the corporate sector.”102
Those NGOs that, like mediators, are central to the corporate
network but, unlike mediators, are tied only to a few industrial
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 46.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 46-47.
97. Id. at 47.
98. Id.
99. Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 47.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Galperin, Trust Me, supra note 49, at 435-36 (challenging the use of
the term “pragmatic” as applied to activist organizations, critiquing the practice of selfdescribed pragmatic activists, and offering a constructive framework for developing more
effective and more pragmatic environmental activism.)
102. Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 47.
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sectors, are called “bridge” NGOs.103 These bridges receive
influence from specific sectors but can transmit that influence
widely within the NGO community. 104 The Rainforest Alliance
and Center for Clean Air Policy are examples.105 The Center for
Clean Air Policy, for instance, maintains close ties with the
energy sector, but only that sector, thereby offering a specialized
knowledge into the network. 106
“Independent” NGOs are on the outside of the corporate
network, having limited corporate relationships, but the
relationships they do have are with a variety of sectors. 107 These
NGOs have the capacity to develop innovative solutions insofar
as they are not tied too closely to any one perspective. 108
However, independents such as Rainforest Action Network and
American Forests may not have the NGO connections to
popularize their innovations and therefore need to work with
more connected organizations such as the mediators. 109
The final type of NGO in Hoffman’s analysis is the
“captive.”110 The captives are on the edge of the network, having
only a few corporate partnerships, which makes them similar to
the independents, but unlike the independents, their partnerships
are all within the same industry sector. 111 Captives are primarily
the hunting- and fishing-focused NGOs,112 though some
surprises, such as the Sierra Club, are also in this category. 113 The
network independence but limited set of sectoral ties allows
captives to be independent but also more easily influenced by
their limited relationships. 114 As such, these groups can have
significant influence on a sector, which allows for localized
innovation, but they may not have the means to diffuse that
innovation more widely. 115
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 47.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 48.
Id.
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In 2010, Hoffman and Professor Stephanie Bertels put this
network analysis in more context as they sought to answer the
question: who is part of the environmental movement.116 Despite
the nuances and heterogeneity of the movement, Hoffman and
Bertels still see a general schism between those that “define their
identity in terms of a conflict orientation to corporations and
corporate activities” and those with a “consensus orientation with
business and the capitalist system.” 117 This schism may, in fact,
be widening.118 But this schism is not without its strategic
benefits. For instance, breaking the environmental movement
into two broad camps of collaboration and confrontation, or
moderate and radical, does allow a “flank effect.” 119 Ideally, the
flank effect would work to build trust in the moderate NGOs,
allowing them to appear more legitimate and more moderate in
comparison to the radical flank, thereby creating leverage for
consensus.120 However, the effect can backfire, and the targets of
NGO action, such as corporations, might characterize all NGOs
by the most polarizing actions of the radical flank, thereby
making any agreements more challenging. 121
While the strategic analysis of the flanking effect roughly
categorizes environmental NGOs into just two camps, Hoffman
and Bertels argue that it is still “best to think of the movement as
a series of intertwined networks composed of a diverse array of
actors.”122 Appreciation of the network of environmentalism
allows analysis not just of bipolar flanks, but of the nature of
connections within those flanks and how those connections
influence behavior. 123
More recently, professors Bertels and Hoffman offered
another typology, this time looking not as NGOs as nodes in a
corporate network, but as institutional challengers. 124 In Shades
of Green Hoffman and Bertels argued that environmental
organizations are all part of a network, but can be understood
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 14.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 14, at 62-63.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76.
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better based on their location in that network. 125 In The Varied
Work of Challenger Movements: Identifying Challenger Roles in
the U.S. Environmental Movement, they argue that another
important analytical perspective is that “organizations within the
environmental movement are all challenging longstanding
institutions in the pursuit of environmental protection . . . [but]
there are differences in what they do, with whom they interact,
and how they understand or present themselves.” 126 Bertels and
Hoffman then take their findings about the types of challenger
work that NGOs do and integrate it with the earlier analysis of
NGO-corporate networks.127
This synthesis produced another typology, which is based on
the network position, identity, and work of environmental
NGOs.128 The categories in this typology are portal, coordinator,
member, fringe player, and purist. 129 Portals are groups at the
center of the environmental network, who identify themselves as
“professionals of the environmental movement,” and see their
work as varied, but with significant focus on attempting to engage
corporations in facilitative change. 130 Coordinators are similarly
connected to the full network but less through their corporate
connections than through their other NGO connections. 131 The
coordinators also identify themselves as professionals, but unlike
the portals they see their work as more disruptive than
collaborative.132 Members are centrally networked as well, but
their identity is issue specific rather than broadly
environmental.133 Given their more limited issue identification,
the work of the members is more centered on information and
local campaigning around their key issues.134
The remaining two categories are purists and fringe
players.135 These groups are related in their network position
because both are satellites, completely or mostly unconnected
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 42.
Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1193.
Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1194.
Id.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1195-96.
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from the rest of the environmental network. 136 They differ in their
identity and work. 137 The purists identify as intentionally
disconnected, as “independent, and challenging the power and
actions of institutional incumbents (in this case, corporations).” 138
As such, their work is disruptive, “focused on questioning or
undermining the moral foundations that are considered
appropriate in a particular cultural context.” 139 Fringe players, on
the other hand, identify themselves as more mainstream players,
and are therefore unintentionally unconnected to the rest of the
network.140 Their work is more limited, but usually disruptive, 141
which may be a consequence of their inability—through
disconnection—to be more collaboratively influential.
This work from Bertels and Hoffman provides an important
synthesis of the earlier research into the role of environmental
NGOs. While the earlier political science approaches to NGOs
focus on NGO actions 142 and Hoffman’s individual project
assessed networking, 143 this latter effort combined network
positioning, and, importantly, organizational self-identity.144 The
qualitative notion of self-identity links this literature back to the
legal scholarship, which more conceptually and normatively
describes the roles of NGOs in pursuing legal instrument
selection.145 That is, the non-legal literature identifies the
importance of self-description alongside more fixed variables
such as connectivity. The legal literature then provides NGOs
with a rich analysis of the two variables they can more fully and
directly control, rhetoric and legal instrument selection.
Of course, rhetoric and instrument selection can also
influence connectivity, particularly corporate connectivity.
Hoffman and Bertels point out that it is the corporate targets of
NGO action that decide “who is a legitimate representative for
environmental concerns.”146 Those groups that define themselves
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1195.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1192, Table 7.
See, e.g., McSpadden & Culhane, supra note 75.
Hoffman, Shades of Green, supra note 76, at 42.
Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1172.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 14, at 52.
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as collaborative and professional as opposed to challenging and
radical are more likely to attract corporate engagement. 147 But
legitimacy in the eyes of a target industry or corporation can
undermine legitimacy within the larger environmental movement.
“Through steady interaction, NGOs can find themselves aligning
more with the corporations they are trying to influence than the
causes to which they were originally attached.” 148 Legitimacy in
the eyes of a target industry can also possibly undermine efficacy.
Through repeated commitment to certain strategies and tactics—
to certain legal instruments—“members of social movements
may develop a preference for particular tactics or strategies,
which may be partly independent of their efficacy.” 149
All of this indicates that productive NGO efforts require an
incredibly detailed and nuanced study of NGO practices. We
must understand NGOs vis-à-vis their corporate targets and
partners, as independent agents who promote certain legal
instruments, as participants in a robust network of influencers and
actors, and, more subtly, as story tellers. Environmental
decisionmaking is ethical decisionmaking and as such, there are
no value-free or value-neutral “easy answers.”150 Every NGO,
therefore, has “responsibilities in crafting stories of more (or less)
sustainable business practices.” 151 These stories help to develop
a shared understanding of environmentalism and the relationship
between NGOs and private environmental governance. In
demonstrating the heterogeneity of environmentalism,
particularly with respect to private environmental governance, all
of this research illustrates that we have not yet reached a shared
understanding (or perhaps we have lost the shared understanding
that once existed.)
“[S]hared understandings . . . legitimate and motivate
collective action.”152
Thus, while there is no need for
environmental NGOs to agree on ethics, on instruments, on the
role of corporate players, it is essential to have a framework for
147. Id.
148. Id. at 66.
149. Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1175.
150. Sharon M. Livesey et al., Performing Sustainable Development Through EcoCollaboration: The Ricelands Habitat Partnership, 46 J. BUS. COMM. 423, 446-47 (2009)
[hereinafter Performative Sustainable Development].
151. Id.
152. Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1173.
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understanding the practices of the varied players in the
environmental movement. The literature so far brings us very far
along the path of understanding, but we still have further to go.

III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING NGO
ACTIVISM
The purpose of this article is to move us one step further
down the path of understanding. The non-legal literature has
already developed extensive descriptive analysis and typologies
of NGO action in the field of private environmental governance.
The legal literature has already offered conceptual narratives.
This article is a first attempt at splitting the difference. Rather
than creating a typology or categorization that looks backwards
to describe NGOs, I want to offer a system for analyzing
individual NGOs more contemporaneously. This system is not
designed to sort NGOs by strategy or compare their relative
efforts. Instead, the system is a uniform method for assessing
individual NGOs. Through that uniformity we will ideally have
a shared language for considering environmentalism and the role
of NGOs in private environmental governance.
This NGO assessment framework is made up of four simple
categories: (1) Goal; (2) Governance Priority; (3) Target of
Change; and (4) Key Tactics. (See Table 1). These categories are
meant to reflect the dominant areas of prior research, to fill in
gaps in that research, and to offer a high-level but meaningful
swath of variables.
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Table 1: Overview of Assessment Framework

GOAL

Nature
Human Health
Economic
Growth
Peace

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY

TARGET OF
CHANGE

Public or Private
Prescription
Markets
Property
Information/
Transparency

Policymakers
Litigation
(administrative)
Research
Policymakers (elected) Policy advocacy
Industry/Business
Consulting/
Individuals (as voters) Collaboration
Individuals (as
Public/Media
environmental actors) Outreach
Direct Action
Info Sharing
Market Influence
Market Participation

KEY TACTICS

Goal. This category augments the existing research by
forcing attention to an organization’s existential purpose. 153 The
goal is a high-level statement that summarizes the ultimate
commitment of the organization. For instance, the goal might
include “protecting nature,” “advancing economic growth,”
“defending human health,” or “assuring peace,” among many
other possibilities.
Governance Priority. Governance priority, which might
also be called “governance strategy,” recognizes that in striving
for its ultimate goal, an organization will have a number of highlevel options for working towards that goal. As Professor
Vandenbergh defines it, “governance” is simply a restriction on
behavior.154 In working towards “protecting nature” for example,
we should ask what sort of restrictions on behavior a group
prioritizes. This choice of restriction need not be the sole
mechanism for progress, but it should be the one or two that an
organization most clearly prioritizes.

153. See, e.g., sources cited supra Section II, which review practical aspects of NGO
operations including relationships, tactics, network centrality, and self-identity, but not
mission statements or organizational charters.
154. Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 916.
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Drawing on Light and Ort’s description of public and private
governance as utilizing parallel tools, 155 this category first
assesses whether an NGO prioritizes public or private governance
and then asks which more specific public or private governance
instruments an NGO favors. The more specific instruments
within both the public and private governance options are a
slightly condensed version of Light and Ort’s menu.156 For this
framework, the parallel instruments are prescription, markets,
property rights, and transparency.
Prescription is “mandatory duty-imposing rules that govern
behavior directly.”157 In public governance this covers the
majority of traditional “command and control” strategies
including performance standards and technology standards. 158 In
private governance it includes intra-firm rules, industry-wide
rules, and third-party certification schemes that mandate specific
performance or processes to earn certification.159
Markets include public or private tools for modifying the
behavior of firms in existing markets 160 and creating entirely new
markets.161 This consideration merges several of the instruments
that Light and Orts broke out separately. 162 Thus, taxes, charges,
fees, subsidies, and tradable permit regimes are all within this
bucket. On the public side, taxes, charges, and fees amount to
public incentives for more environmentally friendly private
behavior.163 In private governance, firms can use these same
instruments to promote or restrict intra-firm practices.164
Subsidies, in both public and private governance, are simply the
inverse of taxes, charges, and fees, offering a financial benefit for
good behavior rather than a cost for bad behavior. 165 Tradable
permit regimes, in public and private governance, create new
155. Light & Orts, supra note 3, at 4-5.
156. Id. at 23.
157. Id. at 24
158. Id.
159. Id. at 25-26. Strictly speaking, in the private sphere these are not truly prescriptive
as they are always voluntary insofar as any firm can change its own rules or exit larger
industry and certification schemes at their pleasure.
160. Light & Orts, supra note 3, at 33.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 34.
165. Light & Orts, supra note 3, at 35.
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markets by setting and distributing a limited number of
allowances for a given behavior and allowing firms or units
within a firm to buy and sell these allowances depending on their
marginal costs.166
Although tradable permits mimic or create property rights,
in this framework I treat property rights as a separate instrument.
The idea of private property as an environmental protection
instrument is that private ownership will help avoid the tragedy
of the commons. 167 In public governance, property rights
primarily emerge when the government itself holds land such as
National Parks. 168 The line is fuzzier when governments allow
private individuals to assert publicly-granted rights in private
property.169 For instance, an individual can exclude others from
her land because the government has created the private right to
exclude, and she can use public institutions such as the courts to
enforce this exclusion. 170 Despite the public involvement, for
these purposes it is typical to consider private ownership of
environmental resources to be private governance unless the
government has specifically created a new type of property as is
the case with trading regimes.
Transparency is the final governance strategy option. As an
environmental protection tool, transparency leverages
information and reputation to influence market decisions. 171
Whether through disclosure of environmental practices, labeling
regimes that signal a set of environmental commitments, or
rankings and awards that name and shame based on
environmental performance, both consumers and producers may
behave differently based on a more transparent view of
environmental impacts. 172 Public efforts at transparency typically
create mandatory disclosures, such as those required by the
National Environmental Policy Act, 173 or voluntary but publicly
organized labeling systems like the National Organic Program. 174
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 29.
Light & Orts, supra note 3, at 29.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 44.
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Private industry has created similar structures, including WalMart’s requirement for certain supplier disclosures 175 and
industry-wide voluntary labeling opportunities such as LEED
certification.176
Target of Change. This category asks which changemakers
an NGO targets to achieve its goal. In pursuit of overarching
goals, NGOs must identify the key players who can help
implement their preferred governance strategy. Although they
will frequently have several targets, NGOs are likely, through
their rhetoric and practice, to attend to only a limited number of
changemakers. 177 In this assessment I identify four possible
targets of change: (1) The Electorate; (2) Policymakers; (3)
Corporations; and (4) Individuals. The electorate, that is,
individuals in their capacity as political actors, can be powerful
changemakers through their votes. Policymakers, both elected
and appointed (that is, administrative officials), are a narrower set
of targets who have more direct control over public
environmental policy. Corporations and corporate leadership
have large and direct influence over many environmental
concerns. Finally, individuals not as political actors, but as
individual environmental actors, are also frequent targets of
change. Here, NGOs target individuals for private behavioral
changes such as reducing their energy use, recycling, limiting
their water use, and so forth.
Key Tactics. The final area of assessment in this framework
is the tactics on which an NGO choses to rely. An NGO’s tactics
are the way it carries out its goals. While governance strategy
points to its more philosophical preferences, and target of change
identifies the source of change, tactics looks at the specific tools
and procedures that an NGO implements. This is the most diverse
variable among the four that make up this framework. It includes
methods such as litigation, policy advocacy, consulting and
collaboration, public and media outreach, direct action,

175. Light & Orts, supra note 3, at 42.
176. Id. at 45.
177. Jane Nelson, The Operation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in a
World of Corporate and Other Codes of Conduct 2 (Harvard Univ. Corp. Soc. Responsibility
Initiative,
Working
Paper
No.
34),
https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_34_nelson.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HTU-AVQT].
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information sharing, market influence, market participation, and
scientific research.

IV. METHODS
This article demonstrates and tests this new framework by
applying it to a small but diverse set of environmental NGOs.
Although I selected the NGOs non-randomly to provide an
interesting sample, the methods for assessing how each NGO fits
within this framework are consistent in order to make it easily
replicable. In this section I will briefly describe the sample set of
NGOs and then more fully explain my methods for gathering and
assessing the data.
A. The NGOs
To test the new NGO assessment framework I look at eight
United States based NGOs that represent a spectrum of
reputations, rhetoric, and realities. (The full list is available in
Table 2 along with web addresses for each NGO’. The logos for
each NGO are presented in Figure 1).
Figure 1: Logos of the Eight NGOs in this Analysis
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Given the comparison at the outset of this article,
Greenpeace and TNC bookend the sample as they are examples
of large, well-known, organizations with distinctly different
reputations.178 Within the traditional, mainstream, policy-based,
community I have selected the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF).
These NGOs are among the largest by revenue, the oldest—
having both been founded at the emergence of the modern
environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s—and
both are well-connected with federal policy leaders.179 The
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) and the Union of
Concerned Scientists (UCS) are on the list to represent important
environmental NGOs with more unique specializations and focus
than the likes of EDF and NRDC.180 Each identifies special
aspects in their work, respectively, electoral politics and scientific
solutions.181 Sierra Club and 350.org round out the sample. I pair
these organizations because they represent grassroots activism
and public engagement as primary identifications 182 but also
because the Sierra Club is the nation’s oldest environmental
group, founded in 1892,183 and 350.org is among the newest,
founded in 2007.184

178. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 4-10.
179. See, e.g., Shades of Green: A Movement at Midlife, E&E NEWS, https:// www.
eenews.net/ special_reports/ shades_green [https://perma.cc/LM56-9635].
180. About Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 53; About LCV, LEAGUE
CONSERVATION VOTERS, https:// www.lcv.org/ about-lcv/ [https://perma.cc/A2Q3-C5F7];
About Us, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (hereinafter NRDC, About Us], https://
www.nrdc.org/ about [https://perma.cc/PD7R-QS95]; About Us, UNION CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS [hereinafter UCS, About Us], https:// www.ucsusa.org/ aboutus#.WsQ3HHeZPdc [https://perma.cc/4MSB-LNEA].
181. Mission, LEAGUE CONSERVATION VOTERS, https:// www.lcv.org/ mission/
[https://perma.cc/68EF-9J3L] [hereinafter LCV Mission]; UCS, About Us, supra note 180.
182.
About the Sierra Club, SIERRA C LUB, https:// www.sierraclub.org/ about
[https://perma.cc/4GP3-HVT7]; About 350, 350.ORG, https:// 350.org/ about/
[https://perma.cc/6YT3-VLNC].
183. Shades of Green: A Movement at Midlife, supra note 179.
184. Id.
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Table 2: NGO Sample Set and Websites
The Nature Conservancy

https://www.nature.org/

Greenpeace USA

http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/

Environmental Defense Fund

https://www.edf.org/

Natural Resources Defense
Council

https://www.nrdc.org/

League of Conservation
Voters

https://www.lcv.org/

Union of Concerned
Scientists

https:// www.ucsusa.org/

Sierra Club

https://www.sierraclub.org/

350.Org

https://350.org/

These organizations are only a small sample of those active
and effective within the environmental movement. The purpose
here is not to offer a comprehensive analysis of the NGO
community and their approaches to private environmental
governance, but to present a small sample that will demonstrate
the workability and value of the new framework offered in this
article.

B. Data Gathering and Analysis
The data for this analysis comes exclusively from the
websites of the subject NGOs. Although the information
presented on websites probably does not present the most
objective picture of each organization, 185 it allows for consistent
data gathering and it recognizes the important subjective aspects
of NGO activism. Speaking to both the subjectivity and
communicative value of how NGOs represent themselves,
185. Kirstin Munro, Hegemonic Stories in Environmental Advocacy Testimonials, 31
ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 233, 233 (2017).
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Professor Sharon Livesey and colleagues explain that the “power
of language” NGOs use to describe themselves is “constitutive
rather than simply reflective of realities.” 186
Websites for environmental organizations seem to be
consistently organized. To create a regular process for gathering
similar data on each organization, I assigned specific website
pages as data sources for each specific category within the
framework. To gather language about an NGO’s goal, I reviewed
the mission statements and “about us” pages. To understand each
governance strategy, I looked again at mission statements and
“about us” pages, but further considered the way organizations
describe their specific program areas and the victories that they
choose to highlight.
Typically, in each program area an NGO will describe the
goal of the program—for example, to protect public lands or
advance renewable energy technologies—and will specify the
specific strategies for achieving those goals. 187 These strategies
are identifiable as public or private and then as prescriptive,
market-, property-, or transparency-based. Looking at victories
provides similar insight except that it not only shows what NGOs
have achieved and how they have achieved it, but what particular
types of victories (for instance, public or private) they decide to
highlight and which strategies they credit for achieving the
victory. Through victories we can get a particularly clear view of
the stories that NGOs tell about themselves.
I gathered data for target of change by looking at active,
ongoing campaigns. Because victories only paint a picture of
what has worked in the past, they tell stories perhaps of the best
targets, but they cannot as precisely demonstrate who NGOs
chose to target at the outset of a project. NGOs often describe
their current efforts by pointing to the changemakers they are
targeting.188 Finally, for key tactics I look again to active
campaigns to search for the specific tools mentioned therein. I
also look again to the “about us” pages, which almost always

186. Livesey et al., supra note 150, at 425.
187. See e.g., About, AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, https:// acore.org/ whatwe-do/ [https://perma.cc/GAX5-QK5U]; About World Land Trust, WORLD L AND TRUST,
http:// www.worldlandtrust.org/ about/ index [https://perma.cc/Y49M-R9KA].
188. See e.g., About LCV, supra note 180.
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describe each NGO based on its favored, or most unique, tactics
and tools.
Across each category I relied primarily on these consistent
sources but did not avoid drawing data from other sources where
it was explicit or especially emphasized. In some cases the front
banner on a website, consistent introductory language, or repeated
links would point to data that was clearly relevant for better
understanding an NGOs behaviors. Naturally this process leaves
room for researcher bias. I reviewed findings with a research
assistant in an attempt to minimize this.

V. FINDINGS
Unlike the existing typologies, the framework and the
method of analysis described above does not try to categorize
environmental NGOs.
Instead, it facilitates an efficient
characterization of environmental NGOs. A categorization or
typology creates a limited number of pre-determined boxes,
which is useful for comparing a large number of entities, while
characterization is a more flexible tool for more nuanced
assessment of a smaller number of entities. Of course, every
NGO in this assessment plays a number of roles, has a broader
strategy than just what is presented below, is willing to target
many different changemakers, and employ tactics from a very
diverse toolbox.
This is one reason a more flexible
characterization, even while imperfect, can offer some insights
that categorization cannot.
Even in placing blinders on a more holistic view of NGO
behavior, by forcing a more cabined assessment, this framework
for characterization is buoyed by social science research. The
research suggests that NGOs struggle to fruitfully play multiple
roles.189 Identifying only a few roles may help NGOs understand
where to focus. Research further underscores the importance of
rhetoric and discourse. 190 By translating the repeated and
outstanding rhetoric into this framework, it can help NGOs better
understand their own signaling and that even when they try to
play multiple roles, often only one or two will rise to the top.

189. Bertels et al., Challenger Movements, supra note 76, at 1200.
190. Livesey et al., supra note 150, at 425.
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The next part of this section will briefly describe the
application of this new framework to the eight sample NGOs.
The final part will offer a summary analysis of the findings.

A. The Framework Applied
1. The Nature Conservancy
Goal. TNC describes its work as “protecting nature, for
people today and future generations,” and its mission “is to
conserve the land and water on which all life depends.”191 Thus,
its twin goals are people and nature.
Governance Priority. TNC catalogues its victories under the
story of its history. 192 Beginning in 1955 TNC highlights land
acquisition as “a key protection tool.” 193 Throughout the
remainder of its history section land acquisition is repeated as
important victories. 194 In addition to property acquisition
(through fee title and easements), TNC also describes the way in
which it achieved success by pushing governments to designate
land reserves. 195 Its prioritization of land acquisition is likewise
evident in the about page, which describes the number of acres of
land protected and the diversity of habitats included in this
conserved land. 196 Land acquisition is central to only one of the
key program areas listed on TNC’s “priorities” page, but it is also
the only program area that, in its summary description, actually
commits to a specific governance strategy. 197 That is, while other
programs speak generally of “working to protect rivers” or
“solutions that will reduce emissions,” the “Conserving Land”
191.
About Us: Vision and Mission, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://
www.nature.org/ about-us/ vision-mission/ index.htm? intc= nature. tnav. about
[https://perma.cc/469A-93AJ].
192. Our History: History & Milestones of The Nature Conservancy, NATURE
CONSERVANCY, https:// www.nature.org/ about-us/ vision-mission/ history/ index.htm?intc
=nature.tnav.about [https://perma.cc/7P37-G5RK].
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. TNC, About Us, supra note 4.
197. Our Priorities: Addressing Conservation Challenges Around the World, NATURE
CONSERVANCY, https:// www.nature.org/ ourinitiatives/ urgentissues/ index.htm?i
ntc=nature.tnav.ourwork [https://perma.cc/3HNQ-SCGR].
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program area specifically points to the governance strategy—
property.198
Private governance, through property, is the clear TNC
governance priority, though public governance, also through
property, in which TNC pushes for new public land conservation,
is an important strategy as well.
Target of Change. TNC’s key targets are, somewhat
surprisingly, not directly related to its governance priority.
Because TNC can acquire interests in land without significant
engagement from other changemakers, TNC’s key targets are
related to its other priorities, including protecting water and
oceans, stabilizing the climate, and improving urban
environments.199 In these areas 200 and as a more overarching
principle, TNC elevates its collaborative and “pragmatic”
nature.201 Whether partnering with multinational corporations or
farmers and fishermen, TNC’s key targets of change are corporate
and business actors. 202
Key Tactics.
TNC relies on land acquisition and
collaborative partnerships as its most prevalent and rhetorically
important tactics.203 TNC describes its “non-confrontational,
collaborative approach” on its mission page, 204 it highlights
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Water: Protecting Our Rivers, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https:// www.nature.org/
ourinitiatives/ urgentissues/ water/ protecting-rivers/ index.htm? intc3=nature.water.lp.r1c1
[https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-SDZG] (targeting farmers through agricultural best management
practices); Water: Ensuring There Is Enough Water for All, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://
www.nature.org/ ourinitiatives/ urgentissues/ water/ enough- water- for- all/ index.
htm?intc3 =nature.water.lp.r1c2 [https://perma.cc/GN3V-U78H] (describing water funds
and markets); Water: Ensuring Water in an Urbanizing World, NATURE CONSERVANCY,
https://
www.nature.org/
ourinitiatives/
urgentissues/
water/
urban-watersecurity/index.htm?intc3=nature.water.lp.r1c3 [https://perma.cc/WY53-BJ6L] (working
with companies to protect urban environments); Providing Food Sustainably: The Future of
Fisheries, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https:// www.nature.org/ ourinitiatives/ urgentissues/
oceans/ providing- food- sustainably/ index.htm [https://perma.cc/8GPJ-B2YX] (targeting
seafood companies and fishermen).
201. See, e.g., Working with Companies: Business Council, NATURE CONSERVANCY,
https:// www.nature.org/ about-us/ working- with- companies/ businesscouncil/ ilc- maincontent.xml [https://perma.cc/3RQB-RZF4]; Working With Companies: Companies We
Work With, supra note 5; Working With Companies: Making Better Business Decisions for
Nature, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/ about-us/working-withcompanies/index.htm [https://perma.cc/JF2P-NKE9].
202. Working With Companies: Business Council, supra note 201.
203. About Us: Vision and Mission, supra note 191.
204. Id.
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partnering with businesses on its about us page, 205 it describes its
first land acquisition and its first partnership on its history page.206
TNC’s key tactics are distinctly partnership and land ownership.
Table 3

THE NATURE CONSERVANCY

GOAL

People
Nature

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY

TARGET OF
CHANGE

Private: Property

Corporate/
Business
Leadership

KEY TACTICS

Land Ownership
Partnerships

2. Greenpeace
Goal. Greenpeace USA’s mission is, in relevant part, to
“promote solutions that are essential to a green and peaceful
future.”207 This statement points to the two key organizational
goals: green—as in environment—and peace.
Governance Priority.
Throughout its about page,
Greenpeace describes itself as a group of activists. 208 Although
this is more descriptive of tactics, it lays the groundwork for their
governance priority, which builds off of pressure rather than
partnership. A close look at Greenpeace’s victories shows their
interest in government behavior but their unique focus on the
activity of private businesses. 209 Greenpeace’s stories focus on
their efforts to pressure large corporations in the forest products
205. TNC About Us, supra note 4.
206. Our History: History & Milestones of The Nature Conservancy, supra note 192.
207. Greenpeace, About, supra note 7.
208. Id.
209. The public governance focus seems to be tailored to President Trump’s
administration, having picked up significantly in the past year. Prior victories demonstrate
more private governance attention. Stories & Victories, GREENPEACE, http://
www.greenpeace.org/
usa/
storiesvictories/
#/
posttype
=victories/
[https://perma.cc/NJ2R-8N3P].
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industry,210 to develop an industry-supported moratorium on
Amazonian soy production, 211 to pressure Shell to stop Arctic oil
exploration,212 to remove chemicals from children’s toys,213 and
even to develop their own technological innovations for private
implementation.214 Unlike TNC, Greenpeace does not identify its
private-sector strategy as a key governance priority (and perhaps
Greenpeace does not identify this way because it has not
considered its activities in this light). But, in fact, Greenpeace
puts significant emphasis on private environmental governance.
Also unlike TNC, this analysis shows that Greenpeace prefers
those private strategies that Light and Orts identify as
prescriptive.215 Greenpeace’s private governance efforts seem to
aim for and result in industry-wide standards and intra-firm
commitments to stop certain environmentally damaging
practices.216
Greenpeace, therefore, prioritizes private,
prescriptive governance.
Targets of Change. Greenpeace focuses on three key targets,
corporations, policymakers, and individuals, though corporations
receive most of the attention. 217 In their effort to protect the
Arctic, for example, they urge “telling all companies and
governments that the Arctic Ocean—and its oil—is off limits
210. Daniel Brindis, The Day I Was Treated Like a Mobster and Served a $300 Million
Lawsuit for Defending Forests, GREENPEACE, http:// www.greenpeace.org/ usa/ stories/ theday- i- was- treated- like- a- mobster- and- served- a- 300-million-lawsuit-for-defendingforests/ [https://perma.cc/YU7X-JR2P]; Great Bear Rainforest: A Forest Solution in the
Making,
GREENPEACE,
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/forests/great-bear-rainforest/
[https://perma.cc/5Q35-AEML].
211. 10 Years Ago the Amazon Was Being Bulldozed for Soy—Then Everything
Changed, GREENPEACE [hereinafter Everything Changed], http:// www.greenpeace.org/ usa/
victories/
amazonrainforestdeforestationsoymoratoriumsuccess/
[https://perma.cc/5VPV-KZ36].
212. Christine Ottery, Shell a Step Closer to US Government Go-Ahead on Arctic
Drilling Plans, GREENPEACE (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/shell-stepcloser-us-government-go-ahead-arctic-drilling-plans/ [https://perma.cc/SUP2-CC9E].
213. Michelle Frey, Toxics Banned from Children’s Toys, GREENPEACE (Aug. 14,
2008), http:// www.greenpeace.org/ usa/ toxics- banned- from- childrens- toys/
[https://perma.cc/CBK7-BATE].
214. Greenfreeze: Refrigerants, Naturally, GREENPEACE, http:// www.
greenpeace.org/ usa/ victories/ greenfreeze- refrigerants- naturally/ [https://perma.cc/EFD4YGG7].
215. Light & Orts, supra note 3, at 25-26.
216. See, e.g., Everything Changed, supra note 211; Ottery, supra note 212; Frey,
supra note 213; Greenfreeze: Refrigerants, Naturally, supra note 214.
217. See, e.g., infra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.

2018

BOARD ROOMS AND JAIL CELLS

437

forever.”218 At the same time, they remind individuals that “our
spending power can contribute to forest destruction . . . .”219 In
their climate change, oceans, and toxics campaigns, Greenpeace
shows the same trio of targets, pressuring companies to do better,
urging individuals to act, and demanding that government
backstop.220
Key Tactics. On its “what we’re doing” page, Greenpeace
explains that it is “investigating, exposing, and confronting
environmental abuse, championing environmentally responsible
solutions, and advocating for the rights and well-being of all
people.”221 Investigating and exposing point to information
sharing, confronting (in conjunction with other activities
described below) indicates direct action, and championing is a
form of market influence insofar as it promotes good products and
companies to consumers.

218. Saving the Arctic, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/ usa/ arctic/
[https://perma.cc/H3TZ-CUCY].
219. Brindis, supra note 210.
220. See, e.g., Fighting Global Warming, GREENPEACE, http:// www.greenpeace.org/
usa/ global-warming/ [https://perma.cc/2KBK-3S9Q] (“Tell J.P. Morgan Chase: don’t fund
dirty tar sand pipelines.”); Living Toxic-Free, GREENPEACE, http:// www.greenpeace.org/
usa/ toxics/ [https://perma.cc/K93D-AM24] (“Since 2011, we’ve challenged some of the
world’s most popular clothing brands . . . .”); Go PVC-Free, GREENPEACE, http://
www.greenpeace.org/ usa/ toxics/ pvc-free/ [https://perma.cc/M6NA-SY94] (“[T]hanks to
everyday consumers demanding change, it is finally becoming less common.”); Preventing
Chemical Disasters, GREENPEACE, http:// www.greenpeace.org/ usa/ toxics/ preventingchemical- disasters/ [https://perma.cc/Q8FF-3935] (“It’s the responsibility of the U.S.
government to mandate that the chemical industry protect those communities.”); Protecting
Our
Oceans,
GREENPEACE,
http://
www.greenpeace.org/
usa/
oceans/
[https://perma.cc/9RW5-NN86] (“We are calling on big corporations to act . . . .”).
221. What We’re Doing, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/what-we-do/
[https://perma.cc/KV4Q-FMSU].
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Table 4

GREENPEACE USA

GOAL

Environment
Peace

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY
Private
Prescription

TARGET OF
CHANGE

KEY TACTICS

Corporations

Direct Action

Elected
Policymakers

Public Outreach
Market Influence

Individuals
Info Sharing

3. Environmental Defense Fund
Goal. The mission of the Environmental Defense Fund is
“to preserve the natural systems on which all life depends.” 222 In
addition, EDF’s website has an “our values” section in which it
says, “[w]e believe prosperity and environmental stewardship
must go hand in hand.”223 Likewise, it offers an “our focus”
statement “benefit people while protecting natural systems.” 224
There is an undeniable focus here on “natural systems” which is
synonymous with “the environment,” “the planet,” or other
similar concerns. But, as evidenced from their comments about
environmental goals going “hand in hand with prosperity” or
“benefiting people,” EDF pairs its overarching environmental
concern with “prosperity,” with thriving human communities.
Governance Priority. In the last stages of editing this article
EDF significantly changed the navigation on and organization of

222. Our Mission and Values, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/about/ourmission-and-values [https://perma.cc/8LBR-CS7J].
223. About Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 53.
224. Id.
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its website.225 Given this change, the governance analysis relies
on the EDF website as it was on November 22, 2017. EDF
highlighted its governance priorities in its victory page, pictured
below as Figure 2.226 This window highlights four key successes
that provide important insight into EDF’s priorities. The
successes that EDF highlights are “Climate protections,”
“Pioneering partnerships,” “Protecting wildlife,” and “Saving
energy.” 227
Figure 2

“Climate Protections” leads to a discussion of how EDF
has been involved in researching methane leakage. 228 This work
is focused on information gathering (“filling a problematic data
gap”) and collaboration with private industry and research
institutions (“collaboration has been critical”).229 “Pioneering
partnerships” is, naturally, about consultation and collaboration,

225. Compare ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https:// web.archive.org/ web/ 20171202034338/
https://www.edf.org/ [https://perma.cc/HQ9F-CWL5] (the EDF homepage as saved through
the Wayback Machine on Dec. 2, 2017), with ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https:// www.edf.org/
[https://perma.cc/YY2N-MRDX] (the EDF homepage as it appeared on April 29, 2018).
226. Featured Successes, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https:// www. edf. org/
[https://perma.cc/YY2N-MRDX] (hover over the “Our Impact” tab at the top of each page).
The website has since changed but historical examples are available through the Internet
Archive “Wayback Machine”, https:// web.archive.org/ web/ 20171119072742/ https://
www.edf.org/ [https://perma.cc/A49T-VNK2].
227. Id.
228. Extensive Research Effort Tackles Methane Leaks, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://
www.edf.org/ climate/ methane- studies [https://perma.cc/K8EE-5VT3].
229. Id.
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highlighting the groundbreaking work EDF began in the 1980’s
with McDonald’s to end the restaurant’s use of Styrofoam and to
reduce its overall waste. 230 This highlights a private, voluntary,
collaborative strategy. In “Protecting wildlife” EDF highlights its
work with private landowners to create conservation incentives
rather than proscriptive regulatory regimes. 231 The website
describes the effort as one to “make protecting wildlife in the best
interest of landowners.”232 It likewise describes farmers and
ranchers as the “key players” in this victories campaign. 233
Finally, in its description of how it has led to “Saving energy,”
EDF focuses on “thriving business” and “the sharpest edge in
business.”234 This victory highlights the EDF Climate Corps
program, which teams up graduate students with businesses to
help find cutting-edge ways to save money while protecting the
environment.235 This is a voluntary, private sector approach.
These four key success areas show a primary governance
focus on private strategies. These private governance strategies
are varied, including market-based approaches where EDF seeks
competitive advantage for example, through its Climate Corps
program, where it seeks information disclosure, as with its
methane research, and where it advances quasi-prescriptive
approaches as with its McDonald’s collaboration. Thus, EDF’s
primary governance priority is private governance, but it is
agnostic about the specific mechanism. EDF also promotes
public governance, but in this area it is more focused on marketbased incentives, as highlighted by its efforts to create
government incentives for wildlife conservation.
Targets of Change. EDF’s targets are more diverse than
its governance priority might suggest. On the “about us” page,
230. McDonald’s Cuts Waste—Saving Billions, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://
www.edf.org/ partnerships/ mcdonalds [https://perma.cc/UD7D-J677].
231.
Protecting Wildlife on Private Land, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/ecosystems/protecting-wildlife-right-incentives
[https://perma.cc/C37M-RAFK].
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. EDF Climate Corps: The Sharpest Edge in Business, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/approach/edf-climate-corps-sharpest-edge-business
[https://perma.cc/BM6Q-NYSE].
235. Id.
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EDF describes “forging the way forward” through “bipartisan
environmentalism,” which includes working with “Democrats
and Republicans” for “federal action toward reducing climateharming methane emissions.” 236 This clearly describes work with
policymakers at the federal level, and suggests an effort to target
both elected and administrative federal policymakers. At the
same time, many of EDF’s campaigns are also focused on
businesses. EDF frequently reiterates is collaboration with
McDonald’s,237 and its ongoing campaigns with Wal-Mart.238
Thus, EDF’s targets are federal policymakers of all types and
business leaders.
Key Tactics. EDF’s homepage has a section labeled “How
we get results,” which perfectly describes its key tactics.239 Here,
EDF points to four areas: economics, partnerships, bipartisanism,
and science.240 Under the header of “economics” EDF describes
its use of markets “mak[ing] it profitable to protect nature.”241
Within “partnerships” EDF describes the importance of teaming
with businesses because “powerful partners” help leverage
change.242 “Nonpartisan policy” uses policy advocacy strategies

236. About Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 53.
237. See, e.g., McDonald’s: Better Packaging, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http://
business.edf.org/ projects/ featured/ past- projects/ better- packaging- with-mcdonalds/
?_ga= 2.42661989. 17117704. 1511797597 -2108026588 .1502820276 [https://
perma.cc/JZU6-EHWT]; McDonald’s and Environmental Defense Fund Mark 20 Years of
Partnerships for Sustainability, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Nov. 15, 2010), https:// www.edf.org/
news/ mcdonald% E2%80%99s- and- environmental- defense- fund- mark- 20- yearspartnerships- sustainability [https://perma.cc/DK5F-UB87]; McDonald’s Cuts Waste —
Saving Billions, supra note 230.
238. See, e.g., About Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 53; EDF & Walmart:
Partnership Timeline, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http:// business.edf.org/ projects/ featured/
sustainable- supply- chains/ edf- walmart- journey/ edf- and- walmart- partnership-timeline/
[https://perma.cc/9SPM-8356]; Getting Toxics Out of Household Products, ENVTL. DEF.
FUND, https:// www. edf. org/ health/ chemicals/ getting- toxics- out- what-we- buy
[https://perma.cc/4PFD-9WX4]; Our Partnership with Walmart Brings Big Change, ENVTL.
DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/partnerships/walmart [https://perma.cc/J4MH-J75F].
239. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, www.edf.org [https://perma.cc/4FUQ-JZ22].
240. Id.
241. Economics: Making it Profitable to Protect Nature, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/approach/markets [https://perma.cc/Q9S6-2MS2].
242. Partnerships: The Key to Scalable Solutions, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/approach/partnerships [https://perma.cc/Y97X-L9SJ].
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to advance environmental legislation. 243 “Science” is the basis
for all EDF’s work because, EDF explains, science leads to
“proven solutions to environmental issues.” 244 Given these
explicit statements, EDFs key tactics are consulting and
collaborative partnerships, policy advocacy, and research.
Table 5

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND

GOAL

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY

TARGET OF
CHANGE

KEY TACTICS

•

Environment

• Private: Agnostic

• Businesses

• Partnerships

•

Prosperity

• Public: Markets

• All
Policymakers

• Policy
Advocacy
• Research

4. Natural Resources Defense Council
Goal. Like many other organizations, both nature and
people are at the center of the Natural Resource Defense
Council’s efforts.245 The NRDC mission reads: “NRDC works to
safeguard the earth—its people, its plants and animals, and the
natural systems on which all life depends.” 246 On the “about us”
page NRDC goes on to further elaborate that it seeks to “ensure

243.
Policy: Cultivating Nonpartisan Solutions, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/approach/policy [https://perma.cc/8276-2NQU].
244. Science: The Driving Force Behind Our Work, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
https://www.edf.org/approach/science [https://perma.cc/B8W8-HXCD].
245. NRDC, About Us, supra note 180.
246. Id.
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the rights of all people to the air, the water, and the wild.” 247 The
initial mission statement elevates the broader environment, but
the specific mention of people, and the latter mention of “rights
of all people” both show the importance of protecting people, not
just the environment, as dual goals.
Governance Priority. NRDC is less communicative about
its governance priorities than other organizations. It does not
frequently cite and laude its private or public governance efforts
in the same terms as others. However, it is possible to divine its
governance philosophy. The “our stories” section of the website
catalogues the victories that NRDC chooses to highlight.248
Although the constantly rotating selection of efforts make it
somewhat difficult to track, these stories are primarily focused on
public governance. There is a description of federal seabed
protection, of banning offshore drilling, and banning wildlife
poisons.249 These stories come along with stories of public-NGO
collaboration, such as an effort in which NRDC and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service worked together to reduce bear mortality
and municipal efforts to improve bus service.250 It both cases
NRDC is focused on public governance. What advances
proscriptive public governance as the specific priority is the call
to action on this same page, which asks readers to contact federal
policymakers, including senators and the President, asking these
leaders to support a variety of prescriptive policies or to oppose
weakening of existing standards.251
Target of Change. As with its governance priority, NRDC
is also less consistent and communicative about its targets of
change as compared to, for example, EDF. The “our work” page
describes the importance for preventing “special interests from
undermining public interests.”252 This points to corporations, or
more precisely, trade associations, as targets. Indeed, in its food
247. Id.
248. Our Stories, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/stories
[https://perma.cc/AEY8-TWAN].
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Our Work, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https:// www.nrdc.org/ work
[https://perma.cc/BSW4-86CT].
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program253 and wildlife program254 NRDC does target business
entities.255 The food program “pushes corporations.”256 The
wildlife program “protects wildlife and unspoiled lands from the
threats of industrial development, commercial exploitation,
pollution, and climate change.”257 All of this is related to private
endeavor, and NRDC targets “ranchers, farmers, [and] energy
companies” to achieve their goals. 258 But in both cases NRDC
also partners with and pushes on government. 259 Moreover, in
their other program areas, government receives individual
attention as a target. The health program targets federal
policymakers through legal action, 260 the oceans program
describes a focus on law and bans, and therefore the necessary
targeting of policymakers, 261 and in their climate and
communities programs litigation targeting government action are
essential.262 NRDC’s primary targets are policymakers of all
types, but businesses—as opponents and collaborators—are also
significant targets.
Key Tactics. While NRDC makes it somewhat difficult to
assess its characteristics within the other categories of this
framework, it does explicitly describe its key tactics. It lists five
key tactics under the heading “how we work”: litigation, business,
science, partnership, and advocacy. 263 It does not, however, give
equal weight to each of these tactics. Litigation is clearly the most
central tactic, as it appears as a tool in almost all of the NRDC
253. Food, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/issues/food
[https://perma.cc/4WFF-F8K8].
254. The Wild, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/issues/wild
[https://perma.cc/C8CK-JXXS].
255. Food, supra note 253; The Wild, supra note 254.
256. Food, supra note 253.
257. The Wild, supra note 254.
258. Id.
259. Id.; Food, supra note 253.
260. Health, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/issues/health
[https://perma.cc/P4BW-M9CR].
261. Oceans, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/issues/oceans
[https://perma.cc/K5K2-QBUJ].
262. Climate Change, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https:// www.nrdc.org/
issues/ climate-change [https://perma.cc/S6QB-JKRZ]; Communities, NAT. RESOURCES
DEF. COUNCIL, https:// www.nrdc.org/ issues/ communities [https://perma.cc/WC3AWW4E].
263. Our Work, supra note 252.
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program areas.264 In describing the climate program NRDC says
“we win court cases.” 265 To protect communities, NRDC
“lawyers go to court on their behalf.” 266 NRDC goes after the
government when agencies fail to enforce health standards by
“tak[ing] them to court.”267 While NRDC definitely uses a
variety of other tactics, including science-based expertise and
partnerships, litigation is its key tool.
Table 6

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL

GOAL

• Nature
• People

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY
Public: Prescription

TARGET OF
CHANGE
• All Policymakers

KEY TACTICS

• Litigation

• Businesses

5. League of Conservation Voters
Goal. The League of Conservation Voters is unique in
that its mission statement speaks less to its goals than its tactics.268
Where it does point to goals, the mission statement speaks of
turning “environmental values” into policy priorities and electing
“pro-environment” candidates. 269 Elsewhere in its high-level
264. Climate Change, supra note 262; Communities, supra note 262; Health, supra
note 260; Water, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https:// www.nrdc.org/ issues/ water; The
Wild, supra note 254.
265. Climate Change, supra note 262.
266. Communities, supra note 262.
267. Environmental Justice, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/
about/ environmental- justice [https://perma.cc/VB62-8TLN].
268. LCV, Mission, supra note 181.
269. Id.
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descriptions, LCV speaks of “combating climate change” and
“protecting the environment.” 270 More comprehensively LCV
writes about diversity, explaining “LCV’s diversity, equity and
inclusivity priorities that we hope will foster a strong,
participatory democracy and environmental movement rooted in
racially, politically and geographically diverse communities
across the country.”271 This excerpt suggests that in addition to
broad environmental protection, “participatory democracy” is
also a goal.
Given its explicit and frequent focus on
environmental protection, “environment” seems the obvious goal.
But the focus on elections and participation also lend credence to
the assertion that participatory democracy is an important goal in
LCV’s work.
Governance Priority. All of LCV’s highlighted victories
describe public governance. 272 Although they do not have a
specific victories page, the page that includes LCV’s mission
statement highlights many victories.273 They describe being a
“standard bearer to determine the environmental record of all
members of Congress.”274 They promote their role in electing and
re-electing many dozens of senators and hundreds of
representatives. 275 Conversely, LCV explains how the majority
of their “Dirty Dozen” anti-environmental candidates were
defeated.276 These electoral victories do not prioritize any
specific governance tools, but as they are focused on federal
electoral politics, they do seem to prioritize public governance
generally. Thus, LCV’s governance priority is on public
governance but is agnostic on more specific mechanisms.
Target of Change. By limiting its work to electoral
politics, LCV has also limited its primary targets. In its most
well-known effort, the LCV scores politicians on their

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id.
Id.
LCV, Mission, supra note 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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environmental voting record. 277 Through this they create political
endorsements and rejections. 278 This effort targets elected
policymakers by attempting to influence their votes based on
elections. At the same time, the National Environmental
Scorecard is a tool for the public, as voters, as they make political
decisions.279 LCV, therefore, targets both elected officials and
individual voters.
Key Tactics. In the effort to persuade voters and pressure
elected officials, LCV uses outreach and information sharing. 280
They produce information for public decisionmaking through
their Scorecard (LCV “has provided objective, factual
information about the most important environmental legislation
considered in Congress”) 281 and they use a variety of public
outreach efforts in order convey this information to voters. 282
Outreach includes “utilizing extensive TV, digital, grassroots, and
earned media campaigns to let the public know about lawmakers’
environmental voting records.”283

277. National Environmental Scorecard, LEAGUE CONSERVATION VOTERS,
http://scorecard.lcv.org/ [https://perma.cc/6A6M-LWQF].
278. LCV, Mission, supra note 181.
279. National Environmental Scorecard: Overview, LEAGUE CONSERVATION
VOTERS, http://scorecard.lcv.org/overview [https://perma.cc/L5D9-JCLW].
280. Our Impact, LEAGUE CONSERVATION VOTERS, https://www.lcv.org/our-impact/
[https://perma.cc/9N9L-A85R].
281. LCV, Mission, supra note 181.
282. Our Impact, supra note 280.
283. LCV, Mission, supra note 181.
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Table 7

LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS

GOAL

•

Environment

•

Participatory
Democracy

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY

Public: Agnostic

TARGET OF
CHANGE
• Voters
• Elected
Policymakers

KEY
TACTICS
• Public
Outreach
• Info
Sharing

6. Union of Concerned Scientists
Goal. “The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing
problems. Joining with people across the country we combine
technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future.” 284
This mission statement from UCS points to two key goals. The
first “our planet’s most pressing problem” signals general
environmental goals, though the possessive nature of “our
planet’s” problems suggests a distinctly human orientation. This
is born out by the latter focus on “solutions for a healthy, safe,
and sustainable future.”285 “Healthy” and “safe,” in particular,
but also “sustainable,” all point to a primarily human focus.
Further, in describing the organization, the “about us” page
discusses the goals of developing “sustainable ways to feed,
power, and transport ourselves, to fighting misinformation,
advancing racial equity, and reducing the threat of nuclear

284. UCS, About Us, supra note 180.
285. Id.
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war.”286 Each of these items is human focused, and suggests that
UCS’ goal is protecting people.
Governance Priority. For each of its six program areas
UCS offers a description of its preferred solutions, which give
deep insight into its governance priority. 287 For example, to
advance clean energy, UCS promotes “renewable electricity
standards . . . [and] clean energy tax credits” as “policies that
promote renewable energy and lower barriers to its adoption.” 288
In its clean vehicle work UCS argues that “[i]mproving the fuel
economy of our nation’s vehicles offers the single greatest
opportunity for reducing oil consumption—and federal policy
provides the most powerful tool for accomplishing it.” 289 With
respect to global warming UCS says that “[a]s individuals, we can
help . . . [,] [b]ut to fully address the threat of global warming, we
must demand action from our elected leaders.” 290 Even in its food
program, an area where private solutions seem more common,
UCS cautions “[f]arm policy has become part of the problem—
subsidizing the wrong foods, steering research dollars toward
industrial agriculture, and creating roadblocks for farmers
who . . . use sustainable practices.” 291 But they promise that
“policy solutions that will help farmers feed a healthy America
are on the table . . . .”292
UCS is prioritizing public governance, but from
prescriptive standards to new investments and a more
deregulatory approach to food and agriculture, UCS is agnostic
about the specific policy tool.
Target of Change. UCS’ efforts target policymakers as
the key changemakers. Their campaigns speak of “demand[ing]

286. Id.
287. See infra notes 288-91.
288. Clean Energy, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/cleanenergy#.Whxyq7T81E4 [https://perma.cc/8Q75-9Q2C].
289. Clean Vehicles, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/cleanvehicles#.WhxyrLT81E4 [https://perma.cc/U4ZB-PLJP] [hereinafter Clean Vehicles].
290. Global Warming, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http:// www.ucsusa.org/
global_ warming [https://perma.cc/NZZ4-PB4H] [hereinafter Global Warming].
291. Food & Agriculture, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http:// www.ucsusa.org/
food_ and_ agriculture [https://perma.cc/VD5T-GGFK].
292. Id.
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action from elected leaders.” 293
But they also target
administrative policymakers through efforts such as their nuclear
energy program in which they pressure the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to adopt and enforce strict safety standards and
overall, “better-regulated nuclear power in the United States.” 294
In the “take action” section of their website UCS offers
seven ways that individuals can currently take action. 295 All
seven ask individuals to target elected leaders by telling their
governor, senators, state officials, or the federal administration to
take specific actions on various environmental issues. 296
Although there are places where UCS mentions the role
of entrepreneurs and private businesses, 297 the great weight of
their effort clearly targets both elected and administrative
policymakers.
Key Tactics. UCS explains its expertise and tactics on its
“leadership and experts” page, which is nested under “about
us.”298 Here they explain that “[o]ur staff experts believe that
rigorous analysis is the best way to understand the world’s
pressing problems and develop effective solutions to them.” 299
Moreover, UCS describes itself as a leader in science
communication.300 Research and information sharing, therefore,
are UCS’ key tactics.

293. Global Warming, supra note 290.
294. Nuclear Power, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http:// www.ucsusa.org/
nuclear- power [https://perma.cc/5MX8-QXUL].
295. Action Center, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http:// www.ucsusa.org/actioncenter [https://perma.cc/T8Q2-R5XT].
296. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Activism, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://
www.ucsusa.org/ take-action/ nuclear-weapons-activism [https://perma.cc/NKT9-C8GS].
297. See, e.g., Clean Vehicles, supra note 289; Food and Agriculture, supra note 291.
298.
Leadership and Experts, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://
www.ucsusa.org/ about/ leadership- experts [https://perma.cc/5PU8-PYS6].
299. Id.
300. Id.
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Table 8

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

GOAL

People

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY

Public: Agnostic

TARGET OF
CHANGE

All Policymakers

KEY TACTICS

• Research
• Info Sharing

7. Sierra Club
Goal. Perhaps because it was originally crafted over a
half century before the mission statements of most environmental
groups, the Sierra Club’s primary declaration of its goals reflects
a slightly different focus than the others. The mission statement
reads: “To explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth,
To practice and promote the responsible use of the earth’s
ecosystems and resources; To educate and enlist humanity to
protect and restore the quality of the natural and human
environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these
objectives.”301 The first line of the mission statement—"To
explore, enjoy, and protect . . .”—is also the tagline for the Sierra
Club, emblazoned across the top of each webpage. 302 Given the
primacy of this first aspect of the mission statement, exploration
and enjoyment stand out as central goals.
A glance at the Club’s program areas demonstrates a
particular commitment to the second aspect of the mission
statement as well. The five key programs that the Club advertises
301. Policies, S IERRA C LUB, https://sierraclub.org/policy [https://perma.cc/MP93TQL6].
302. Id.
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(shown in figure 3, below) are focused on climate and energy
(Ready for 100% [renewable energy], Beyond Coal, and Beyond
Natural Gas), protecting Our Wild America, or championing
outdoor recreation (Get Outside). 303 This focus on climate and
wild land conservation furthers the importance of protecting wild
places as a key goal alongside exploration and enjoyment.

Figure 3

Governance Priority. It is difficult to get a clear read on
the Sierra Club’s governance philosophy because their website
discusses more of the tactics they use and issues they address than
the specific restrictions they seek. For example, the Beyond Coal
Campaign describes the need to retire coal plants, but does not
specify whether those retirements are prompted by private or
public considerations. 304 It therefore requires more reading
between the lines to decipher the Club’s philosophy than with
some other organizations.
The focus of the Club’s mission statement on exploring,
protecting, promoting, and educating all suggest the importance
of private action to the organization’s philosophy. This
importance is also manifest in several parts of the Club’s program
areas. The “Our Wild America” campaign, for instance, describes

303. SIERRA C LUB, https://sierraclub.org/ [https://perma.cc/NP8Z-988Q] (hover over
“See All Programs” tab).
304. Beyond Coal: About Us, SIERRA C LUB, https://content.sierraclub.org/coal/aboutthe-campaign [https://perma.cc/RSD6-G5XN].
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the important efforts of private land owners. 305 Perhaps more
importantly, the Outdoors For All sub-campaign (it is a
component of Our Wild America) is focused exclusively on
getting people outdoors rather than generating any specific public
policy action.306 In this respect it is arguable that here, and in
other similar programs, the Sierra Club’s priority is not
governance at all. However, the language around the Outdoors
For All campaign, as one example, does explain that protecting
natural areas and enjoying natural areas are intertwined, and one
cannot exist without the other. 307 “And along the way, a new
generation of leaders will be inspired to protect and restore our
lands, waters, wildlife, and communities.”308 Given that
exploration and enjoyment are part of a larger protection strategy,
this appears to be a prioritization of private governance. The
more specific instrument of this private governance is more
difficult to pinpoint. It appears that the Club is seeking, through
engagement with and enjoyment of the outdoors, to make a
cultural change in the market by changing the way individuals
value natural spaces. (It is, however, possible that more engaged
individuals will participate in political efforts for public
governance and therefore to interpret this as a signal of public
governance.)
The Club’s “most extensive, expensive, and effective
campaign” is the Beyond Coal Campaign. 309 This campaign
relies on both private market strategies and public strategies. 310
On the private side, the Club describes as victories the retirements
305. Our Wild America: Protecting Lands, Wildlife, and Waters, SIERRA CLUB,
https:// content.sierraclub.org/ ourwildamerica/ protecting- lands- wildlife- and- waters
[https://perma.cc/ZZ4N-TEBA].
306. Our Wild America: Outdoors, SIERRA C LUB, https:// content.sierraclub.org/
ourwildamerica/ outdoors- all [https://perma.cc/78QC-UL2S].
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Michael Grunwald, Inside the War on Coal, POLITICO (May 26, 2015, 11:45 PM),
https:// www.politico.com/ agenda/ story/ 2015/ 05/ inside- war- on- coal- 000002
[https://perma.cc/Z9QD-D732].
310. ZACH R AFF ET AL., EXPANDING BEYOND COAL: D ATA COLLECTION, ECONOMIC
REVITALIZATION AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT S TRATEGIES IN COMMUNITIES
AFFECTED BY COAL P LANT C LOSURES 11-12 (2012), https:// content.sierraclub.org/ coal/
sites/ content. sierraclub. org. coal/ files/ Expanding% 20Beyond% 20Coal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F3VD-PWGR].
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of coal plants across the country.311 These retirements are largely
private economic decisions, 312 although the Club does not
describe the decisionmaking process, or tag this as a private
function, on its main page celebrating the retirements.313
The Club also prioritizes the public governance aspect of
moving beyond coal. When describing the actions that
individuals can take, they focus on pushing public
decisionmakers including the President, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and Congress. 314
In other campaigns the Club continues to demonstrate its
investment in public governance. Our Wild America speaks of
the importance of “legal action” and “legislative
advocacy . . . .”315 Beyond Natural Gas demands “enacting strict
safeguards” and “closing industry loopholes . . . .”316 On the
“about us” page, the Club also mentions its role in the passage of
major environmental laws.317 These campaigns show that in
addition to a focus on private governance, the Club also
prioritizes prescriptive public governance.
Target of Change. The Sierra Club targets policymakers
at all levels of government as well as individuals. Several projects
are focused explicitly and exclusively on getting individuals
engaged in environmental activities such as the interrelated Get
Outside campaign and the Sierra Club Outings program.318 Get
311. Beyond Coal: About Us, supra note 304.
312. Benjamin Storrow, Big, Young Power Plants Are Closing. Is It a New Trend?,
E&E
NEWS
(Apr.
27,
2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060053677
[https://perma.cc/UY4T-MLHC].
313.
Beyond
Coal:
Victories,
SIERRA
CLUB,
https://content.sierraclub.org/coal/victories [https://perma.cc/WK8Y-UP3H].
314. Sierra Club, Our Nation’s Biggest Climate Action is Under Attack. Speak Up to
Defend It!, ADDUP, https://www.addup.org/campaigns/our-nations-biggest-climate-actionis-at-risk-speak-up-to-defend-it [https://perma.cc/GG96-B2LZ].
315. Our Wild America: Beyond Dirty Fuels Initiative, S IERRA CLUB,
https://content.sierraclub.org/ourwildamerica/beyond-dirty-fuels-initiative
[https://perma.cc/T6KG-PCLB].
316. JARED ROBINSON, S IERRA C LUB, CAMPAIGN O UTINGS TOOLKIT 16 (2012),
https://content.sierraclub.org/creative-archive/sites/content.sierraclub.org.creativearchive/files/pdfs/0528-Campaign-Outings-Toolkit_04_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JRPWMEK].
317. About the Sierra Club, supra note 182.
318.
Get Outside, SIERRA C LUB, https://content.sierraclub.org/outings/
[https://perma.cc/5A25-XVVQ].
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Outside seeks to “[a]ctively engage people in the outdoors . . . [,]
”319 while Outings are “for people of all ages, abilities, and
interests.”320 Other projects are equally focused just on
policymakers. The Ready for 100% campaign is aimed at
mayors.321 Beyond Oil works with cities, states and transit
agencies,322 advocates to policymakers at the state and federal
level,323 and pushes Congress, the president, and states.324 In
total, the Club’s key targets are individuals and all policymakers
at all levels of government.
Key Tactics. The Sierra Club is a grassroots organization,
which is both a mere tactic and an more existential structure. 325
On their homepage, the Club declares “We are the nation’s largest
and most successful grassroots environmental organization.” 326
Grassroots activism is, of course, one of the key tactics, but there
are others. On the Club’s boilerplate language at the bottom of
each press release, they conveniently and concisely detail their
key tactics.327 The Club advances its work, says each press
release, “through grassroots activism, public education, lobbying,
and legal action.”328 The Club’s key tactics, then, are grassroots
activism, public outreach (which is equivalent to public
education), policy advocacy (equivalent to lobbying), and
litigation (equivalent to legal action).

319. Inspiring Connections Outdoors, S IERRA C LUB, https:// content. sierraclub. org/
outings/ ico [https://perma.cc/PF9V-XNVH].
320. Ohio Chapter: Get Outdoors, SIERRA C LUB, https:// www.sierraclub.org/ ohio/
get- outdoors [https://perma.cc/8RWX-QD32].
321. Ready For 100, SIERRA C LUB, https:// www.sierraclub.org/ ready- for- 100
[https://perma.cc/DQA7-X6TJ].
322. Clean Transportation, SIERRA C LUB, https:// www.sierraclub. org/ transportation
[https://perma.cc/QP37-A49N].
323. Ready For 100, supra note 321.
324. Sierra Club, supra note 314.
325. SIERRA C LUB, supra note 303.
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., Gabby Brown, Media Advisory: SF Activists to Rally to Call on Wells
Fargo to Divest from Keystone XL, SIERRA CLUB (Nov. 27, 2017), https://
www.sierraclub.org/ press- releases/ 2017/ 11/ media- advisory- sf- activists- rally- callwells- fargo- divest- keystone- xl [https://perma.cc/X7DN-8AAR].
328. Id.
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Table 9

SIERRA CLUB

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY

GOAL
• Exploration and
Enjoyment

• Public:
Prescription

• Protecting Wild
Places

• Private:
Markets

TARGET OF
CHANGE
• Individuals
• All
Policymakers

KEY TACTICS
• Grassroots
Activism
• Public
Outreach
• Litigation
• Policy
Advocacy

8. 350.org
Goal. 350.org does not have an obvious mission
statement on its website. However, in the “about” page, the
organization says “350.org is building a global grassroots climate
movement that can hold our leaders accountable to science and
justice.”329 The same page further says that 350.org attempts to
“oppose new coal, oil and gas projects, take money out of the
companies that are heating up the planet, and build 100% clean
energy solutions that work for all.” 330 The video on this same
page describes the work 350.org does as a battle over power “not
only power as energy, but we need to take back power from the
fossil fuel industry.”331 Further along the organization says “[w]e
believe in a safe climate and a better future—a just, prosperous,
and equitable world built with the power of ordinary people.” 332
329.
330.
331.
332.

About 350, supra note 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In their history, 350.org explains that its “work leverages people
power to dismantle the influence and the infrastructure of the
fossil fuel industry.”333 All of this focus on clean energy and
fossil fuels demonstrates a clear goal of addressing climate
change. In parallel, the repeated call to shift power from industry
to people is a call for environmental populism. Thus, climate
change and populism are the goals of 350.org.
Governance Priority. Although 350.org, like Sierra Club,
tends to focus more on its tactics than governance prioritization,
a survey of 350.org’s domestic victories and campaigns shows a
clear preference for prescriptive public governance. The SolarXL
campaign, which is using direct action (building solar farms in the
path of the KeystoneXL Pipeline)334 and the fossil fuel divestment
efforts335 are counter examples of private governance
(respectively using property and markets). But the weight of
efforts seek public restrictions. Various campaigns are focused
on federal cabinet positions,336 preventing offshore drilling, 337
stopping development of tar sands,338 and using presidential
power to stop the KeystoneXL Pipeline. 339 The fight against the
Dakota Access Pipeline clearly targets the Army Corps of
Engineers and the President, asking them to reject the pipeline. 340
Each of these efforts aims to use public authority to prescribe
environmentally destructive projects.
Target of Change. The “how we work” statement on
350.org’s “about” page offers the best summary of their targets of
333. Id.
334. #SolarXL: Resisting Keystone XL by Building Clean Energy in the Path of the
Pipeline, 350.ORG, https://350.org/solar-xl/ [https://perma.cc/S7X5-DVQE].
335. FOSSIL FREE, https://gofossilfree.org/ [https://perma.cc/ABC9-PM4F].
336. Where Your Senators Stand on the Climate Denier Cabinet, 350.ORG,
https://350.org/denier-cabinet/ [https://perma.cc/B86L-LXEY].
337. ZERO New Offshore Drilling, 350.ORG, https://act.350.org/sign/offshoredrilling-plan [https://perma.cc/4JPW-6KGE].
338. See, e.g., Archive: Tar Sands, 350.ORG, https://350.org/category/topic/tar-sands/
[https://perma.cc/75LS-F3H9]; Who We Support, TAR SANDS BLOCKADE,
https://tarsandsblockade.org/resistance/ [https://perma.cc/LPD4-T6PS] (listing the Maine
subchapter of 350.org as a group “saying NO to tar sands”).
339.
Keystone XL
–
Victory!,
350.ORG,
https://350.org/kxl-victory/
[https://perma.cc/VDR9-YEDA].
340.
President Obama: Stop the Dakota Access Pipeline, 350.ORG,
http://act.350.org/sign/stop-dakota-access-pipeline/ [https://perma.cc/6EW9-W6VN].
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change. 350.org explains that they are seeking to “revoke the
social license of fossil fuel,” which is a targeting of individuals
who, collectively, manifest any social license. 341 They promote
community investment and “support communities confronting
the impacts of climate change,” 342 which is also a focus on
individuals as members of communities and small-scale financial
decisionmakers. Finally, they pressure governments to make
changes at all levels. 343 Individuals and elected officials are the
targets of change.
Key Tactics. According to its “about” page, “350 uses
online campaigns, grassroots organizing, and mass public
actions . . . .”344 They further declare “bringing people together”
as a core principle. 345 350.org builds “diverse coalitions that are
strong enough to put pressure on governments and stand up to the
fossil fuel industry.”346 Grassroots organizing (at the local level)
and mass organizing through online campaigns are the obvious
tactics, but collaboration is also an important component of the
work. While “collaboration” as a tactic frequently signals
partnership with industry, 350.org uses collaboration to mean
collaboration amongst a wider array of entities who can oppose
the target industry “—not just environmentalists, but students,
business owners, faith groups, labor unions, universities, and
more . . . .”347

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

About 350, supra note 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
About 350, supra note 182.
Id.
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Table 10

350.ORG

GOAL

GOVERNANCE
PRIORITY

•

Climate
Change

Public:
Prescription

•

Populism

TARGET OF
CHANGE

KEY TACTICS

• Individuals

•

Grassroots
Activism

• Elected
Policymakers

•

Mass
Organizing

•

Collaboration

B. Summary of Findings
Although I selected the NGOs for this study based on their
diversity of approaches, the application of this new framework
confirms that the universe of environmental NGOs is varied in
many ways that are not typically considered in the private
environmental governance literature but ways that are important
in practice. The initial comparison of the Nature Conservancy
and Greenpeace, for instance, holds true when considered more
closely. Both organizations prioritize private governance, though
each uses a distinctly different instrument within the area of
private environmental governance. This is essential to private
environmental governance in practice because the way that each
group engages with the private sector is different, with TNC
taking a more deferential approach and Greenpeace taking a more
aggressive approach. Having a framework for better articulating
these distinctions will foster a better understanding of the role of
NGOs in private environmental governance.
More broadly, this analysis leads to two larger-scale
observations. First, these environmental NGOs have similar
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goals that do not consistently influence their other characteristics.
Second, there is already a very significant interest in private
governance among environmental NGOs.
Protecting people and the environment are the goals of
most NGOs in this assessment. Each NGO phrases these issues
slightly differently and emphasizes different aspects, but there is
significant consistency here. Some organizations, like TNC and
UCS are very explicit about their anthropocentric goals. Others
are more nuanced, such as EDF, which focuses on prosperity, but
with a clear interest in human prosperity. 350.org, LCV, and
Greenpeace highlight populism, democracy, and peace. In all
three cases the goal is about the agency and rights of individual
people, even if not phrased that way. With respect to the
environmental goal, it is sometimes phrased as protecting
“nature,” sometimes “the environment,” and in one case “climate
change” more specifically. Regardless of the exact phrasing of
either pillar, the consistency here may surprise those who see
environmental NGOs as “tree hugging” radicals who aim to
protect plants and animals over human wellbeing. 348
Half of the organizations considered in this analysis
prioritize private environmental governance. Of these, it is
common to see private governance paired with public
governance, but the prevalence of NGOs participating in the
private governance sphere undermines the general preconception
that NGOs are opponents of private industry. While not
inherently taking oppositional stances to private industry, this
does not imply that NGOs are always working collaboratively. In
the case of an organization like Greenpeace, the private efforts are
more dialectic, creating a tension that, one hopes, will generate
benefits to both the environment and the industry. Others, like
the Environmental Defense Fund and Nature Conservancy, work
more collaboratively, attempting to forge a win-win path that does
not rely on tension or uncomfortable transitions. Importantly,
348. See, e.g., Rod Dreher, Why Do Conservatives Hate Environmentalism?, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Mar. 14, 2014, 12:22 PM), http:// www.theamericanconservative.com/
dreher/ why- do- conservatives- hate- environmentalism/ [https://perma.cc/5RBT-NFKJ]
(explaining that even Wendell Berry objects to environmentalists because they “make an idol
of the natural world and forget about the legitimate needs of human communities”).
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even those organizations that do not prioritize private governance
do work in this space. In this analysis NRDC prioritizes public
governance, but private environmental governance is explicitly a
part—albeit a smaller part—of their work.349 In other words, we
should not overlook the strategic diversity among and within
environmental NGOs.
On the other hand, while there is some strategic diversity
within and among NGOs, there is still a significant lack of
cultural, racial, and intellectual diversity. 350 That environmental
NGOs are dominated by white, male leadership may undercut the
general characterization that environmental NGOs are a certain
breed of organization while corporate America, also dominated
by white, male leadership, 351 is another.352 Whether focused on
corporate change, political process, or individual responsibility,
one could reasonably look at the array of environmental NGOs
and argue that they are working soundly within the same cultural
status quo as corporate leaders, rather than generating radical
change. This observation highlights the need for frameworks like
the one presented in this article, which can serve as proxies for a
variety of organizational characteristics, but it also argues for
additional efforts to better understand environmental NGOs and
how their work impacts not just legal and political outcomes, but
broader social norms.

349. See, e.g., Center for Market Innovation, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL,
https://www.nrdc.org/about/center-market-innovation [https://perma.cc/HHX9-YABR].
350. DORECETA E. TAYLOR, THE S TATE OF D IVERSITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS 3-7 (2014).
351. Stacy Jones, White Men Account for 72% of Corporate Leadership at 16 of the
Fortune 500 Companies, FORTUNE (June 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/09/whitemen-senior-executives-fortune-500-companies-diversity-data/
[https://perma.cc/DJ2V8SY3].
352. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Wal-Mart, supra note 1, at 969.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. The Importance of a Framework for
Assessing Environmental NGOs
The literature on private environmental governance has
consistently relied on the role of environmental NGOs to make
private environmental efforts more effective. 353 However, that
literature, which in many ways is still in its early stages, has not
yet explored how NGOs, in fact, address private environmental
governance. To help close this gap, this article proposes an
assessment framework that looks at four characteristics of NGO
activity in order to better, and more consistently, understand the
relationship between NGOs and private environmental
governance.
The categories of this new framework are goals,
governance priority, targets, and tactics. These categories look to
the primary goals that motivate each organization, the type of
environmental restrictions that an organization prefers, the
entities that an organization pressures to change, and the tools that
an organization uses to make progress.
By applying this framework to eight diverse
environmental NGOs, we can begin to see the diversity among
these organizations, including their unique approaches to private
environmental governance. Half of the NGO sample make
private governance a key priority, though they use a variety of
instruments within the private sphere, including marketinfluence, prescription-like standards, and even property
ownership.354 This conclusion advances the importance of
private environmental governance as an academic and practical
pursuit, but also demands that research in this field take a more
serious and realistic look at the role of NGOs. Ideally, the new
framework that this article develops will help in this endeavor.

353. See supra Part II.A.
354. See supra Table 2 & Part IV.B.
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Private environmental governance represents a new step
in environmental protection and a new challenge for
environmental NGOs. Since the early days of environmental
public interest advocacy, NGOs have played at least two
important roles. First, they have given a unified voice to the
opinions of discrete individuals, allowing them to have a greater
influence in decisionmaking. 355 Second, public interest groups
create and shape public opinion in the first place. 356
The importance of NGO engagement with private
environmental governance is that it helps NGOs accomplish an
important public demand: environmental protection.
As
Professor Vandenbergh and many others scholars have noted,
private firms have a major role to play in addressing
environmental problems.357 In advancing their first role—
promoting the public interest in environmental protection—
NGOs must therefore engage with private firms. As the analysis
in this article shows, NGOs are embracing that role. But as more
NGOs respond to environmental problems by engaging in private
environmental governance, they must still attend to their second
responsibility: shaping public interest in environmental
protection. Counterproductively, in order to most effectively
collaborate, NGO leadership must build trust, and trust demands
restraint in public advocacy. 358
While private firms have incentive to make important
strides in environmental quality, the same incentives apparently
do not exist to foster greater public interest in environmental
protection. At the symposium from which this issue of the
Arkansas Law Review is drawn, Laura Phillips, Walmart’s Senior
Vice President of Corporate Affairs and Sustainability, addressed
355. JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE : THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 3 (1977).
356. Benjamin I. Page et al., What Moves Public Opinion?, 81 AM. POL. SCI. R EV. 23,
37 (1987).
357. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 1, at 129.
358. Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 425-26 (2000).
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this very issue. Phillips showed a promotional video touting
Walmart’s sustainability efforts, which featured such progressive
figures as Michelle and Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, and a series
of Hollywood movie stars. 359 It seemed as if Walmart was
promoting its environmental progress to an audience already
interested in environmental progress rather than persuading
skeptical citizens. In response to my question about why Walmart
did not try to build support for sustainability programs among
more reticent customers, Phillips answered: “We talk to our
customers about what’s important to them . . . .”360 In other
words, Walmart doesn’t shape public opinion, it responds to it.
Private governance, therefore, may make strides in
response to existing public demand, but it does not generate
demand. This undoubtedly leaves NGOs to build, shape, and
activate public opinion. We currently see organizations like
Greenpeace calling on the public to put pressure on private
industry. We concurrently see organizations like TNC working
with industry to implement some of the changes that groups like
Greenpeace demand. What we do not see is a single organization
working collaboratively with corporate leaders while also
building public pressure on these same corporations. This is
because NGO engagement in private environmental governance
is restrictive. To some extent, NGOs have to “choose sides.”
Fortunately, no NGO operates in a vacuum. As the
analysis in this article suggests (and provides a foundation for
further testing), there is an ecosystem of environmental NGOs,
and each can fill a different niche. These niches are sometimes
competitive, sometimes facilitative, and often have room for more
than one inhabitant. While there may be a current disequilibrium,
with a significant number of organizations embracing the private
environmental governance, the diversity of the system is likely to
sustain it.

359. Laura Phillips, Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs and Sustainability,
Walmart, Keynote Address at the Arkansas Law Review Symposium: Environmental
Sustainability and Private Governance (Oct. 27, 2017).
360. Id.

